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PREFACE 
To write a thesis is not an easy task. One is 
told that he must be origin~l and yet he must speak 
with the authority that comes only from wide reading. 
He must give every author credit for the use made of 
his work and yet he must write in his own style and 
language. Yet to write a thesis is a delightful task, 
for one knows that the requirements are ideal and never 
fully observed, even by those whose theses become books. 
So this work has been to the writer both a difficult 
and a delightful task. 
I would like to give credit to all upon whom I 
have drawn for help. I have faithfully sought to give 
references where authors have been quoted either direct-
ly or in summary, but this is not always possible. Some-
times mental notes have been resorted to where card 
notes were lacking, and authors' names Wld books have 
not always been kept with these mental notes. But the 
books read are listed in the bibliography. 
I do want to take this means of expressing my 
gratitude to Dr. M. A. Caldwell for his painstaking 
help and never-waning sympathy and friendship. In 
the class room and in his home he has blended the 
characteristicB of true teacher and understanding 
friend to a degree that is inspiring in retrospect 
as it has been in the actual present. 
Other friends and teachers have helped in ways 
too numerous to mention. I only hope that I may ex-
press true appreciation and gratitude by making the 
best use of their help in further study. 
H. W. T. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Fsychology is the middle ground between philos-
ophy and science. Philosophy deals with the interpre-
tation of facts, with, a view to determining their ul-
timate cause. It is the search for knowledge of general 
principles--elements, powers, causes and laws--as ex-
plaining facts and existences. Scienoe is systematized 
knowledge of facts, laws and proximate causes, gained 
and verified by exact observation. Science is the ef-
fort to show how laws operate, and how certain facts af-
fect other facts. Philosophy seeks to show why laws 
operate as they do, and to discern what is the first 
fact. Soience deals with the sequence of events and 
effects and their immediate causes. Philosoph7 seeks 
to go back through a process of reasoning to the first 
cause, the uncaused cause, and in terms of that to ex-
plain all the series of effects, all the consequent 
facts and factors. Scienoe goes into the laboratory 
and experiments. Philosophy goes to the reason and 
theorizes and then seeks proof of those theories through 
processes of logic. Science is primarily objective in 
its method. Philosophy is primarily subjective. Science 
takes phenomena and seeks to discern the facts and fac-
tors involved. Philosophy takes a basic fact, or type-
phenomenon and builds a system around it, or it begins 
with conorete faots and seeks to gain from them a philo-
sophic truth. It may safely be said that philosophy is the 
parent, soienoe the offspring. 
Between these two great fields of knowledge and 
partaking of both is psychology. Its tendenoy has been 
from the philosophical in method and material to the 
soientific. In that it deals with the mind it is phil-
osophical. Because it is objective it is scientific. 
When it analyzes the states and phases of consoious-
ness and passes judgment upon the nature and funotions 
of the soul it is philosophioal. When it explains the 
workings of the neural, glandular and musoular systems 
of the human organism it is soientific. Psychologists 
in general prefer to oall their field a soienoe, and 
such it is in the main, but as evidenoe of the fact 
that it has always been considered philosophioal the 
average oollege or university currioulum may be noted. 
I. Definition. 
We have been in the habit of defining psyohology 
as the study of the human mind or soul and its opera-
tions, powers and functions. But developments of the 
past fifteen years require that we qualify the defini-
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tion by stating which particular school or type of psy-
chology is meant. The old standard definition no long-
er suffices. For example, it does not fit behaviorist-
ic psychology. From the standpoint of this school the 
terms of the definition are obsolete, as are the older 
methods of study. It would be quite difficult to give 
a definition of psychology that would set forth all the 
schools that we have today. It probably would be so 
general that it would be a very poor definition. It 
will not be attempted here. 
But since our concern is with behaviorism it is 
well enough for us to seek a definition of t his partic-
ular school of psychology. Here a gain we are embar-
rassed with differences. Not all behaviorists are of 
the same stripe. What may be true of one group may be 
only partly true of another, and not at all true of 
still another group. But we shall never be able to 
eliminate differences among thinkers. watson says be-
havi ori am is Ita natural science that takes the wh ole 
field of human adjustments as its own • •• It is dif-
ferent from physiology only in the grouping of its 
probl~s, not in fundamentals or in central viewpoint. 
Physiology is particularly interested in the function-
ing of parts of the animal--for example, its digestive 
system, the circulatory system, the nervous system, the 
excretory systems, the mechanics of neural and muscular 
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response. Behaviorism. on the other hand, while it is 
intensely interested in all of the functioning of these 
parte, is intrinsically interested in what the whole an-
imal will do from morning to night and from night to 
morning.- l 
To know what the animal will do under certain cir-
cumstances or conditions the behaviorist observes his 
action under present conditions, analyzes that behavior 
in terms of stimulus and response, and then predicts 
the behavior of the animal when the stimuli are known. 
"The behaviorist asks: Why don't we make what we can 
observe the real field of psychology? Let us limit 
ourselves to things that can be observed, and formu-
late laws concerning only those things. Now what can 
we observe? Well, we can observe behavior--what the 
organism does or says. And let me make this fundament-
al point at once: that saying is do1ng--that is, be-
having. Speaking overtly or to ourselves (thinking) 
is just as objective a type of behavior as baseball. 
The rule. or measuring rod, which the behaviorist puts 
in front of him always: can I describe this bit of be-
havior I see in terms of 'stimulus and response'? By 
stimulus we mean any object in the general environment 
or any change in the tissues themselves due to the 
physiological condition of the animal. By response 
we mean anything the anima l does--such as turning towards 
i 
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or away from a li&~t, jumping at a sound, and more high-
ly organized activities such as building a skyscraper, 
drawing plans; ... writing books, and the like.-2 
The behaTiorist scorns such terms as consciousness, 
mind, soul, instincts, will, emotions, and substitutes 
'response'. These responses, or reactions, he groups 
as 'unlearned behavior' and 'learned behavior'. All 
instincts are the results of training or conditioning 
--belonging to man's learned behavior. 3 Yet there are 
same phases of behavior that he calls unlearned behav-
ior, two of which psychologists have been calling in-
stincts, grasp~ing and the fear response. The human 
organism is a physical machine which is conditioned by 
the environment in which it grows from birth to the 
grave. There is no mind, only a brain, muscles and 
glands; no c~nsciousness, only reactions to stimuli and 
muscular retention of the impressions of those stimuli; 
no emotions, only glandular activity; no thinking, on-
ly vi sceral response (subvocal talking) to internal or 
external stimuli. In short -the ' doctrine of behavior-
i am can be surnmed up briefly in two statements: (1) 
that psychology deals only with what can be observed; 
(2) that consciousness is a meaningless term. n4 By 
observation the behaviorist means what can be done by a 
photographic plate or a spring balance just as well as 
by a human being. 
? 
Extreme behaviorism not only says that we can get 
along without the term consciousness, but it goes on to 
dogmatize and say that there is no consciousness, that 
what we have been calling consciousness is nothing more 
nor less than a mechanical response or group of r~sponses 
of a merely physical organism to physical stimuli. There 
is, however, a modified behaviorig,m which claims that 
psychology can get along without the term consciousness, 
but they do not say that there is no consciousness. 
Neither do they say that behavior is merely mechanical 
response. They allow for an element of purpose and 
choice which comes very near being conscious activity. 
We shall have more to say about them a bit later. 
It is perhaps worth while to take a few minutes 
and a little space to point out that what this thesis 
is concerned with is behaviorism, not merely behavior. 
All psychologists are agreed that the study of behavior 
and the effort to control human activity are the ob-
I 
jects of this great field of study. Behavior is activ-
ity. and it may be conscious, semi-conscio~s, subcon-
scious. or unconscious. Behav10rimn says it is non-
conscious. 
II. History. 
Behaviorism is a modern type of psychology. It is 
the newest of the new psychologies. It began around 
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1912 as a bold break of a few men from the traditional 
method and terminology of psychology. Perhaps these 
pioneers did not undertake to forecast the results of 
what they were initiating. Certainly they only sought 
to establish a new method in psychology. They urged the 
need "of a category common to the physiologist and the 
psychologist in terms of which the problems of bodily 
and mental function might be discussed without arous-
ing metaphysical prejudices."5 At first it was quite 
clear that the behaviorista did not arbitrarily rule 
out the mental, or the conscious. They merely made 
the , claim that they could present a system of psychol-
ogy without the use of these or kindred terms. Some 
even thought that behaviorism would act as a supple-
ment to other psychologies. Bauden, in the article 
quoted above, suggests that "the data derived from the 
individual's observation require to be checked by the 
data deri ved from observat10nby other lndi viduals here 
just as they do elsewhere. The -scientific standpoint 
is always the standpoint of the observer, the third 
person's point of view."S 
Madam Grace A. DeLaguna, in an article on HEmo_ 
ti on and Percepti on from the Behan ori st Standpoint" 
that appeared in the November 1919 number of the Psy-
chological Review, summed up the status of behaviorism 
at that time in the following brief statement. "At 
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present behavioris.m is a program rather than an achieve-
ment; a method of approach rather than a theory possess-
ing scientific credentials." Then she delineated the 
new movement as to its sources. ·So far the behavior-
ist movement has had two distinct, if not wholly inde-
pendent sources. On the one hand, we find a group of 
experimental investigators of animal behavior, occupied 
with such problems as that of deterrtining what mode of 
response, if any, is called out in a given species by 
a given physical stimulus; how given types of reaction 
are excited, and how they are modified. On the ~ther 
hand, we find a group of philosophical behaviorists, 
who are chiefly concerned with the metaphysical as-
pects of the new doctrine and who devote themselves al-
most exclusively to the task of defining consciousness 
in terms of behavior. The two groups of thinkers find 
a common ground in their conviction that the study of 
mind and the study of behavior are not two things but 
one, and that the investigation of the so-called phe-
nomena of consciousness can be fruitfully carried on 
only through the study of behavior." 
These two sources, or trends, have come together 
in the behaviorist of the present time. He is no long-
er satisfied to term his movement a method or an atti-
tude, but he insists rather dogmatically that his is the 
only psychology, the acceptance of which must eliminate 
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all differing schools of thought. At present the status 
of behaviorimn appears in three aspects. There is, 
first, the central problem of an unproved hypothesis 
which portends radical changes not only in psychology, 
but in many kindred fields as well. The purpose of 
this thesis is to follow through sane of the philosophi-
cal implications to their logical conclusions. It is 
manifestly impossible to deal with all the problems that 
behuTiorism raises. It would be like following a tap 
root through all of its branches in an almost unending 
maze. Second, there is a bold challenge from the be-
haviorists, the extreme proponents particularly, to 
all who do not accept their doctrines. "Show us," 
they say to the subjective psychologists, "that you 
have a possible method, indeed that you have a legiti-
mate subject matter. Prove to us that philosophy and 
the social sciences based upon your speculations have 
any right to further take up the time and thought of 
developing students.·7 
The third aspect is that of the dogmatic claims 
that certain results are already being attained by be-
havioristic teachings. For example, Watson sees in-
trospective and functional psychology giving way to 
behaviorism. ~uite naturally he feels that behaviorism 
will soon be the only psychology known. He sees phil-
osophy being transplanted by the history of science, 
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behaviorimn completely obliterating philosophy. Ethics, 
he thinks, is becoming experimental ethics based en-
tirely upon behavioristic metho~s. He sees social psy-
chology "rapidly becoming a behavioristic study of how 
groups--family, village, national, church and the like 
--build up habits (attitudes) in the individual during 
the formative period and thus maintain control of him 
throughout life." "Sociology is merging into behavior-
istic social psychology and into economics." Religion 
is "being replaced among the educated by experimental 
ethics." Psycho-analysis is "being replaced slowly by 
behavioristic studies on the human child where scien-
tific methods are being established for conditioning 
and unconditioning the child. When such studies are 
carried to an ideal state, there should be no reason 
for psychopathic breakdowns or disturbances in the 
8 
adult. " 
The establishment of these claims is a part of 
the task ahead of behavioristic psychologists. Not all 
behaviorists are so bold or dogmatic in making them. 
Same seem to follow the leading of the extremists with 
but a partial understanding, of the consequences involved. 
Others, recognizing the trend of the extreme position, 
are content to hold a sort of middle ground position, 
not denying the validity of introspective psychology 
but affir.ming the greater practical value of behavior-
12 
istic psychology. 
III. Types. 
There are several types of behaviorists. McDoug-
al19 gives three and SellarslO gives four. There is a 
group who grant the existence of facts of consciousness 
and that those facts are capable of treatment, apart 
from behaTior. They accept psycho-physical parallel-
ism with emphasis on the physical. McDougall calls 
these the near behaviorist. He says that they are sep-
arated from what he calls the strict behaviorists by 
the fact that they neither deny nor totally ignore the 
facts of conscious activity. "They give the impression 
that they would much like to do this, but they have not 
the courage of their desires. They see that to deny 
the whole realm of introspectively observable facts is 
too flagrantly absurd and that to ignore them may be a 
little dangerous. But they are allied to the Strict 
Behaviorism party by their neglect to make use of the 
introspectively observable facts and by their accept-
ance of its tmuscle-twitchism'. For them every in-
stance of human conduct or animal behavior is merely 
a mechanical reflex response to a sensory stimulus; and 
they resolutely shut their eyes to all the objective 
(as well as the subjective) evi dences that behavior is 
a goal-seeking process." 
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Another type admits the existence of the facts of 
conscious experience but denies that they are suited to 
any form of scientific treatment. This is what Sellars 
calls Methodological behaviorism. It emphasizes animal 
psychology. A third type McDougall calls purposive be-
haviorism, which denies the facts of conscious activity 
but . recognizes fully the objectively observable fact 
that behavior is obviously a goal-seeking process. 
There is a fourth type, which Sellars calls radi-
cal behaviorism and McDougall terms strict behaviorism, 
which refuses to recognize the facts of consciousness 
and denies the goal-seeking nature of behavior. Their 
claim is that behavior can be best explained without any 
reference to purpose. Mind is behavior and nothing else. 
This is the extreme position. It is the type of behav-
iorism that Watson at present is championing. Walter 
S. Hunterll has elaborated a system which he calls an-
throponomy, which is just another name for this type of 
behavi ori sm. 
Sellars suggests a final type which he calls syn-
thetic behaviorism. He bases his statement of this 
posi ti on partly on the arti cles by Lashley on "Behav-
iorism and Consciousness" in the Psychological Review 
in 1923. Here mind represents a level of organic re-
sponses and processes centering in the nervous system 
and finding expression in muscular activities. The 
\ 
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total response is behavior. Mind and consciousness are 
worked into the ordinary system of biology. "Ordinary 
self-consciousness and introspection give data to psy-
chology concerning the nature of mental responses. This 
is a monistic, evolutionary position." 
In seeking to follow through some of the philosophi-
cal implications of behaviorism the purpose of this thesis 
will be to try to keep in mind the main doctrines of all 
the se group s, wi th the emphasi s naturally falling on the 
extreme position, strict or radical behaviorism. 
IV. Method. 
A word as to method may be in order before going 
into the body of the thesis. The method of behavior-
ism is objective only. It limits its acquisition of 
dat·a to one channel, whi ch per force eliminates the 
benefit of a check which an additional approach would 
offer. It may be that this is a fundamental defect of 
the whole system. However, if introspective psychology 
can be proved to be false there will remain no alterna-
tive but the single-track objective method. In the 
meantime it seems evident that the data of behaviorism 
are dependent upon a certain subjective element, whether 
ignored or recognized. The behaviorist who ob serves 
the beha vi or of another person under experiment is him-
self reacting to stimuli (the stimuli and the re spon se s 
15 
of the other one become the stimuli to the observer) 
and somehow (subjectively?) is interpreting those stim-
uli and devising laws on the basis of his interpreta-
°ti ons. It is di ffi cult to see how it is throughout a 
merely objective method after all. But this will be 
discussed in a later connection. 
The method adopted here is neither objective nor 
subjective as such, but perhaps both. It is not to be 
a laboratory study using experiments, but a logical and 
ph;losophical study using the data of the behaviorists. 
The desire of the writer is to eliminate prejudice as 
far as pos~ible. The effort will be to show what fol-
lows if the claims of behaviorism are true, following 
these claims out to their logical conclusions. These 
conclusions may have something to do with the validity 
of the claims. But the claims are to be tested logi-
cally. The central and determining principle here is 
that any theory to gain scientific support must, in 
its methods and conclusions, accord with the fundamental 
and generally established principles of science. 
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CHAPTER II 
MET AFHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The relation between philosophy and psychology 
has already been suggested. It is an intimate rela-
tion, so much so that any radical change in one's ac-
ceptance of psychology calls for a corollary change in 
his system of philosophy. Indeed philosophy is the 
field of thought that makes use of all other fields 
of thought. It is "an attempt to gain unity in our 
.thinking." It is, according to Herbert Spencer, com-
pletely unified knowledge, whereas science is partial-
ly unified knowledge. It seeks to bring all the 
sciences into a unified system. It is an attempt to 
understand the world and life. It seeks to correlate 
and combine the results of all the sciences into a 
world view that will satisfactorily answer the question-
ings of the human mind as to the use, meaning, purpose 
and value of life. l According to Dr. Ribben, 2 "the 
problems of philosophy are, in fact, the problems of 
life, the burden and mystery of existence, the origin 
and destiny of man, the relations which he sustains to 
the world of which he is a part, and to the unseen uni-
verse which lies round about him." 
Any theory of the mind affects the theory of life 
that the mind holds. Herein arises the relation be-
tween behavioristic psychology and metaphysics. A 
more detailed discussion of the behaviorist's view of 
the mind will be reserved for a later place in this 
chapter. Here it is enough to point out that his 
theory of the mind in general is that it is a system 
of reactions to external and internal stimuli. Meta-
physics, or ontology, is a branch of philosophy that 
deals with ultimate reality. There has always been 
considerable difference of opinion as to the function 
and character of this phase of philosophy. "Before 
Kant's time there was a very general tendency to build 
up theories of the nature of things on the basis of a 
priori reasoning. Certain metaphysical principles were 
assumed to be necessary, and the acceptance of these 
principles led to the deduction of various propositions 
which were held true of reality as it is in itself, i.e., 
of reality as it exists without relation to the condi-
tion of our experience. This method of procedure is 
called dogmatism, and the metaphysics thus developed is 
dogmatic or rationalistic metaphysics." This may be 
dualistic, as exemplified by Descartes, or monistic, as 
seen in the system of Leibnitz and Hobbes. 
If we could conceive of a negative dogmatic meta-
physics that would probably be the type that extreme be-
20 
havioriRm would offer. It moves upon the a priori as-
sumption that there is no consciousness, or mind, or 
soul, and builds a dO@natic system around this nega-
tion. The denial of consciousness is not a conclusion 
that the behaviorist reaches after a series of experi-
ments, but it is his assumption fram which he deduces 
all the doctrines of his system. His experiments mere-
ly serve to support those conclusions. That is a priori 
reasoning. One needs only to glance through a behavior-
ist's book to see that it is a dogmatic system. 
There are philosophers who hold to a type of meta-
physics called empiricism. They derive their knowledge 
of reality from experience and not from a priori prin-
ciples. The experience that behaviorism knows is ex-
pressed in terms of stimuli and response, and these are 
in ter.ms of the general premise, or the assumption re-
ferred to above. still another group holds that, while 
there is an ultimate reality, it cannot be reached by 
human faculties. These faculties do not present us 
with the real as it is in itself, but with the results 
of their elaboration. Behaviorism denies that we have 
any faculties, save the muscles and glands of the phys-
ical organism which respond in a certain manner under 
certain conditions. 
If the assumptions of behaviorism are true then 
what is ultimate reality? Will the conclusions of this 
21 
school of psychology have anything to do with the con-
clusions of philosophy as to reality? There are three 
general philosophical theories of reality: monism, dual. 
ism, and pluralism. These theories represent the desire 
of the human mind for unity in plurality, to find the 
one in the many. For our purpose here it is well enough 
to consider these theories in the following order: dual. 
ism, pluralism, and monism. 
I. Dualism. 
The word dualism is somewhat ambiguous, being used 
in philosophy in two senses. It is sometimes used to 
designate the belief in a good and a bad principle 
which lie at the root of all things. This particular 
kind of dualism we may consider later in connection with 
the implications of behaviorism that bear upon ethics. 
The other sense in which the word is used is the theory 
that the universe as a whole can only be explained with 
two fundamentally different kinds of constituent ele-
ments. In ancient philosophy these two elements were 
matter and form, while in modern times they are mind 
and matter. Descartes distinguiShed between thinking 
substance (mind) and extended BUbstance ,(matter). The 
difficulty which this view inevitably raises is to ex-
plain how mind and matter interact as they apparently 
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do in experience. One of the earliest attempts to solve 
this difficulty resulted in the denial of interaction 
and the claim of concomitance of variations. under di-
vine control. "This simply puShed the difficulty a 
step farther back. If mind cannot act upon matter. 
then God, conceived as mind. cannot act upon matter; 
but conceived as other than mind. cannot act upon mind."' 
A possible modern solution of the difficulty is parallel-
ism, which holds the concomitance of brain processes and 
mental processes, but denies that there is any relation 
of cause and effect between the two. 
But how does extreme behavioristic psychology handle 
this difficulty? It is quite evident that for this kind 
of behaviorism the difficulty does not exist. There is 
no relation between mind and matter, for there is no 
mind apart from matter. What we have been calling mind 
is merely the type of reaction of the organism to the 
stimulus which, or the results of which, we have ob-
served. This reaction may be muscular, visceral or 
glandular, but in any case it is a part of the physical 
organism, and not a mind or consciousness that is apart 
from and yet within the organism. And so the radical be-
havioristic psychologist cannot hold to philosophical 
dualism. The two are irreconcilable. 
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II. Pluralism. 
Another philosophical theory of reality is plural-
ism. This is the view that reality cannot be reduced 
either to one or two ultimate forms of being. Reality 
is many. This theory runs all the way from Empedocles, 
about 450 B. C.--who held that the four ultimate ele-
ments of reality are earth, air, fire, and water--down 
to the present day. Pluralism today is found in two 
general fo~s: that of William James, which was the 
result of his radical empiricism, and the philosophy 
of the New Realism. The fo~er emphasized the per-
ceptual flux, with such realities as beginnings, ends, 
indeteroinations, eYil, crises, catastrophes and es-
capes, a real God and a real moral life.5 The latter 
emphasizes the world of reason, th~ught and values. 
-Physical and mental things, events and processes are 
real in this realistic pluralistic system, but so also 
are principles of reason, lOgical principles, internal 
and external relations, numbers, space, time, series, 
and such ideal entities as justice and beauty. These 
latter non-physical and non-mental entities we may, if 
we choose, call sUbsistents, if we wish to limit the 
term existent things to such as are conditioned by 
~ace and time.·6 
Behaviorism has no place for subsistents. It 
neither provides nor implies any way of knowing objects 
24 
independently of space and time. The reactions of the 
physical orga~ism are only determined by physical stim-
uli. The claim of the behaviorist that given the stim-
ulus he can predict the response, or given the response 
he can describe the stimulus, precludes the possibility 
of holding eith~r of these types of pluraliam. Since 
all human activity is physical response the organism 
has no capacity for receiving any other than a physical 
stimulus. Thus even man's thinking (what the behavior-
ist calls sub-vocal talking) is concerned only with phys-
ical objects. The moral life, the conception of God, 
principles of reason, justice, beauty and such like are 
not realities but phases of the mechanical adjustments 
'of the organi em. 
There is also a pluralistic Idealism which should 
be g1 ven a place in thi s grouping. It is perhaps best 
set forth in the extreme Idealism of Berkeley. Reality, 
he said, consists of minds, spirits and souls, plus 
their ideas. God, the infinite Spirit exists, and a 
realm of finite s pirits, but the objects we call material 
are merely objects of experience. This is pluralistic 
in the sense that it considers each spirit as having its 
own world in its own ideas. Leibnitz contended that the 
ohjects we see about us and that we study in science have 
real existence inde pendent of the ID~nd that per ceives 
them; but that when we come to examine into their real 
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nature we find that in their inner being they are mental 
or spiri tual. He deve loped hi s system along the lines 
of the old atomic theory, holding that all objects of 
sense are made up of certain ultimate units, which he 
called Monads. Physical bodies are composed of Monads 
over which the soul 1B the governing Monad. These, and 
all other types of Idealism, may be included in the d1~ 
cussion given below in relation to the effect of the 
conclusions of radical behaviorism upon Idealistic phil-
osophies. 
With these types of pluralism ruled out by behav-
iorism there are only two alternatives left. Either 
there may be a pluralism of only material realities, or 
behaviorism leads to some for.m of monism. A pluralism 
of only material realities is not a pluralism at all, 
but one substance in many for.ms and manifestations. 
III. Moni sm. 
The third general theory of reality is Moni sm. 
This view also takes two forms, Idealism and Material-
ism. Idealism puts the emphasis upon mind, as in some 
way prior to matter. It holds that mind is real and 
tha~ matter is only an appearance. There are several 
types of Idealism, running from Plato down to the 
present day. Plato's Idealism was not extreme in the 
sense that there is nothing in the universe but mind. 
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He taught rather that the significant things of the uni-
verse, the real things, are Ideas, and by Ideas he did 
not mean merely mental states. "He meant real object-
ive things or 'forms' which are not material."' They 
are patterns or standards for the things of sense. These 
patterns, such as beauty, truth, justice, and goodness 
are the cosmic realities, while what we call matter he 
ter.med non-being, not that it does not exist, but it 
does not have significance. Panpsychi~ is another type 
of idealism. According to this view, as the word indi-
cates, all reality is psychic in nature. This solves 
the mind-body problem on the basis of correlation be-
tween mind and brain. The mind is the sole reality, 
the body is its outer appearance. 
Voluntaristic Idealism reduces the universe to ab-
solute will. The physical world is but an expression of 
will. Kant made the distinction between the noumenal 
and phenomenal realms. The phenomenal world is the ob-
jective world of our experience. The noumenal is the 
realm of reality back of phenomena. Kant called it the 
Ding an Sich, or thing-in-itself. Finally, there is 
Absolute Idealism. Fichte taught that reality is swal-
lowed up in the ego, the Absolute Ego, the supreme 
reality. Hegel said that reality is reason. The world 
is a great thought process. "What we call nature is 
thought externalized; it is the Absolute Reason reveal-
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ing itself in outward form. But nature is not its final 
goal. Returning, it expresses itself more fully in ~. 
man self-consciousness and in the end finds its com-
plete realization in art, religion, and philosophy.uS 
Now, what of behaviorism and these types of Ideal-
ism? In the first place let us examine behaviorism a 
bit more thoroughly than we have done with reference to 
the place it gives mind. watson regards mind as a 
passing and useless concept. In the place of the 'con-
cept mind' he would have a description of the way the 
whole body behaves. To show the needlessness of the term 
'mind' he describes a fanciful picture of a dog trained 
to spurn ~resh steak and to eat decayed fish. By use of 
electric shocks he was trained to fear and avoid female 
doge. Through other processes he was made over into a 
whining, growling, emaciated specimen of canine flesh 
and bonee. Then, (without referring to the dog'e mind) 
he trains him to be friendly with other dogs and with 
man, to eat fresh meat and to sleep naturally, until 
finally watson sees his imaginary dog t&ke the blue 
ribbon in a show over the best bred and pedigreed and 
moet intelligent dogs of the land. ThuB would watson 
meet the needs of the mentally sick man. We are not 
concerned here with the question of mental diseases, 
whether there are any such and how to cure them (it is 
in this connection that watson introduces the above il-
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lustration) , but this indicates the point we are search-
ing for here in our study. He allows no place for mind 
in his system of psychology. He does not find any evi-
dence of it, and should he stumble across some signs 
that point to the presence of a mind he could not deal 
with it without disrupting his whole scheme. 
As has already been pointed out there are behav-
iorists and behaviorists and they cannot all be put un-
der the same label. The only way we have of knowing be-
havioriRm is through its proponents. It is evident that 
some of these are more liberal toward the mind concept 
than the extremists. For example, Bauden ,says that mind 
is behavior of a certain sort. "It is behavior iq which 
certain objects which serve as excitants are undergoing 
experimental reconstruction into stimuli adequate to the 
incipient response. It is behavior in which certain at-
titudes are undergoing reorganization into adequate at-
ten ti anal di scriminati on of the response.·9 He goes 
further in this strain to define psychology as "the 
science of the behavior of organisms in so far as they 
exhibit mentality. Behavior--not all behavior, but be~ 
havior in so far as it presents the character of the 
mental as distinguished from the chemical, the physical, 
the vital. Mentality--behavior in its aspect as in-
ducing fresh forms of it self. "10 
Wieman says that "mind or mentality means a certain 
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mode of doing things on the part of an organism. "II He 
gives an illustration from Holtl s "The Freudian Wish" 
of a man who is fond of mushrooms. He finds some but 
is afraid to eat them le st he should get same of the 
poisonous species. He is in a conflict of emotions. 
The basis of adjustment is the ability to distinguish 
between the good and the poisonous mushrooms. "Men-
tality," he then concludes, "is the process by which 
vari ous stimulated tendencies of the organi em are ad-
justed to the execution of a series of movements result-
ing in adaptation to the environment. Ite mode of op-
eration is the organization of diffusive tendencies into 
a definite system under the 'control of e orne dominant 
propensity having an instinctive basis. This propensi. 
ty oonsists either of an innate series of reflexes or 
of Borne system of tendencies which has been organized 
in the past experience of the individual and which per-
sists as an established physiological motor set."12 
This is not the language of a radical or strict behav-
iorist, for there is too much importance attached to 
attention and instinct. watson would brush this aside 
and go back to the question of stimuluB and response, 
with the response conditioned only by previous stimuli. 
Mind and consciousness are kindred terms. By many 
they are used synonymously. To say the least, they are 
two concepts that are hard to define. The strict be-
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haviorists make a great deal of this difficulty, argu-
ing that it is due to a fundamental error, namely, an 
effort to define something that doesn't exist. What-
eTer the definition may be it is surely agreed that one's 
psychological interpretation of consciousness deter.mines 
largely his philosophical interpretation of reality. That 
is our purpose in seeking some sort of definition here. 
The Relational Theory of consciousness, as first 
formulated by Woodbridge, holds t~at "Consciousness is 
the result of the interaction between the organism and 
its eurroundings.- l3 Colvin and Bagley describe con-
sciousness in the following terms. -It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that consciousness puts in an ap-
pearance when it is required to aid behavior. The ser-
vice that consciousness renders 1s to adjust the organ-
ism better to its surroundings. When there is perfect 
adjustment there is no need of consciousness; when, how-
ever, the organism is not so adjusted, then conscious-
ness is necessary in securing a better adjustment.- l4 
Such a description is far fram identifying conscious-
ness and physical behavior. The position represented 
by Eliott P. Frost is an advance step in the behavior-
istic tendency. He says, -energy is stored in some 
mOdified fashion by past experience; it is put in 
action by the stimulus now affect~ng the organism; its 
result is to modify the machinery of behavior in terms 
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of that past experience. This is what and this is all 
that psychology oan mean by conscious processes."l5 
This leads logioally to the position represented by 
Lashley. "The concept of consciousness,· he says, "is 
then, that of a complex integration and succession of 
bodily activities which are closely related to or in-
volve the verbal and gestural mechanisms and hence most 
frequently come to social expression. The element,s of 
content are the processes of reaction to stimulation 
-and do not di ffer in essenti al mechani em from the spinal 
reflex of the decapitated animal to the most complex 
adaptive activity of man."16 
There we have the place that radical behaviorism 
provides for mind or consciousness. They are but vague 
terms that other psychologists use to designate what 
the behaviorist thinks of as the action of the whole or-
ganism. And so it is quite plain that he would not em-
brace Platonic Idealism, tor he reacts only to material 
objects (what Plato called the non-being). and he would 
never get the significance or forms or ideas of those · 
objects. In like manner the subjective Idealism of 
Berkeley means nothing to the behaviorist, for he does 
not believe in the existence of minds or spirits or 
souls. So also with Leibnitzts Monadology and with 
Panp sychf em , and Voluntari stio, Kantian, .and Absolute 
Idealism. When behaviorism drops all reference to the 
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mind and reduces what we have called mental activity to 
physical behavior it also closes all doors that lead to 
philosophic Idealism. 
There is, however, a modern type of philosophy 
which is not monistic but is very close kin to Ideal-
ism. It is Personalism. It holds that ultimate real-
ity is personality. Prof. Ralph Tyler Flewelling, in 
his book "Creative personality,- points out that real-
ity must abide and yet undergo change. Only person-
ality meets this test. Material objects have signifi-
cance only as they come in contact with persons. They 
exist, but not for meaning apart from persons. Space 
has no meaning save as persons relate objects. Time 
is meaningless save as persons relate events in past, 
present and future time. Motion is a fallacy unless it 
is gauged by some person. Ideas are but the thoughts 
of persons. 
Now, the behaviorist defines personality ae "the 
sum of activities that can be discovered by actual ob-
servation of behavior over a long enough time to give 
reliable information. In other words, personality is 
but the end product of our habit systems •• 17 By habit 
he means repetition of conditioned response until it 
occurs readily upon a very slight stimulus. All such 
conditioned responses constitute what we call person-
ality. There is no will in personality, though one 
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type of moderate behaviorists ~dmits a goal-seeking 
element in human activity. Yet it is difficult to see 
how there oan be any purpose or goal-seeking in be-
havior without some element of what we oall conscious 
activity. This definition of personality also leaves 
out emotions. watson defines emotion as "an hereditary 
'pattern-reaction' involving profound changes of the 
bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the 
visceral and glandular systems.- lS If such a definition 
means anything, it is that emotion has nothing whatso-
ever to do with what we have been calling conscious 
activity, but that it is another name for physical re-
sponse. And so personality is not a factor but a re-
sult of physical stimuli. The only thing necessary to 
change personality is to have the stimuli strong enough. 
Thus personality does not abide, but changes with con-
ditione. Then there is no supreme personality as ulti-
mate reality, but for every personality there must be 
greater stimuli to evoke the responses that make the 
personality. 
2. Materialism. 
The other type of monism is materialism. It 1s 
the view that the world is best explained as a redis-
tribution of matter, that there is nothing in the world 
but matter, that mind 1s a for.m or a function of matter. 
Fram Democritus on Materialism has ffequently taken the 
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form of Atomism, indeed the two terms have at times been 
used interchangeably. Here all matter is thought of as 
consisting of an almost infinite number of particles, 
called atoms, which whirl about in space, thus giving not 
one basal concept as monism requires, but three--atoms, 
space and motion. 
These concepts have led to the modern type of ma-
teri ali sm known as Naturali em or posi ti vi em. I t places 
more emphasis upon the mechanical character of the 
world process and less upon the substantial ground of 
the world. This is the emphasis of the physical sciences 
upon philosophy. Indeed positivism limits philosophy 
to the results of the natural sciences. This is· to be 
expected when all other methods and subject matter than 
those of physical science are discarded. The only 
philosophy that can fit into such restrictions is 
mechanism, and this is about the only type of material-
ism to be found in the present age. Perhaps it should 
be said that mechanistic philosophy is not so popular 
among philosophers as it is among scientists who have 
ventured into the field of philosophy. 
Every system of philosophy must have some type 
phenomenon or basic assumption upon which it builds 
and fram which are ultimately drawn all its conclusions. 
If an extreme behaviorist should have a philosophy it 
would have to be in terms of the stimulus-response for.mu-
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lao That would be his type phenomenon. He claims that 
given the stimulus he can predict the response, or given 
the response he can describe the stimulus. He also 
claims that all responses of the human organism are 
solely physical adjustments to those stimuli. Over 
these responses there is no human intel l igence ruling. 
Only as we are conditioned by certain stimuli can we 
rise to greater and nobler responses. The implication 
in these claims is that there is no spirit nature in 
man. It is even more than an implication, for the 
radical behaviorist brushes aside the mind concept and 
consciousness. For him the organism is made up of the 
sense organs, the reacting organs, consisting of the 
striped muscles, the unstriped muscular system of the 
viscera and the glands; and the nervous system, whiCh 
consists of the brain, spinal cord and the peripheral 
nerves which run from sense organs into brain and spinal 
cord and thence to the muscles and glands. There is no 
place in all th~s system for any semblance of the spirit 
nature of man. 
Extreme behaviorism goes yet farther and elimin-
ates the spirit outside man. Since man is capacitated 
only to respond physically it is inconceivable that a 
spiritual stimulus would call forth any response at all. 
Hence man cannot know anything about a spiritual world 
or a spiritual being if there is any such. The behav-
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iorist claims that man is equipped only with the learned 
and unlearned response system of the organism, and can 
only observe that which comes to him in the form of 
stimuli. Thus his philosophy would have to be material-
istic, and, since he places more emphasis upon the pro-
cess of conditioning and response it must be mechanist-
ic. His laws are the laws of the conditions and re-
sponses, and so if he should observe that certain laws 
operate in the universe he would conclude that they 
were the resultants of certain conditions, which in 
turn resulted fram certain other conditions, and so on 
back in an infinite regress. 
When we say that radical behaviorism is material-
istic and mechanistic we may expect a protest fran same 
of its adherents. Lashley answers, ·perhaps it is such, 
to the extent that modern physics and physiology are 
materialistic, but the word materialism implies a meta-
physical theory of reality, whereas these sciences are, 
at least in their systematic treatment, altdgether phe-
nomanological. Psychophysical dualism and epiphenom-
enalism do imply theories of the ultimate nature of 
mind and matter, but behaviorism claims to avoid this 
and to attempt nothing more than a logical and a mathe-
matical description of experience such as is presented 
by the physical sciences. To stigmatize this as materi-
alism is to appeal against behaviorism to the prejudices 
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aroused by a crude metaphysic which is nowhere implied 
in its doctrines.- l9 We reply in his own words. -The 
acceptance of a physical world seems to me to involve 
as a corollary a behavioristic psYChOlogy._20 That is 
a rather clear and positive implication that the be-
haviorist has a theory concerning ultimate reality. It 
behaviorism is the loglcal corollary of the acceptance 
ot a physical world, then behaviorism must be built 
upon the assumption that there is nothing but a physi-
cal world. 
The behaviorist may suggest that the physical 
world is not necessarily matter, that it may be energy. 
Could a behaviorist hold a philosophy of energetics and 
deny materialism? Ostwald propounded the theory that 
"the various properties of matter are special forms of 
energy (kinetic, thermal, chemical, magnetic, electric, 
etc.), which cannot be reduced to one another. Psychic 
energy is another form of energy; it is unconscious or 
conscious nervous energy. Interaction is explained as 
the transition fram unconscious to conscious energy or 
the reverse."2l Thus it seems that energy is an at-
tribute by virtue of which matter can effect changes in 
other matter. Philosophy is primarily interested in 
the quali tati ve, rather than the quanti.tati ve, attri-
bute of reality. Perhaps that explains the fact that 
the theory of energetics has been left largely to the 
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field of the exact sciences, principally physics and 
chemistry. At any rate the behaviorist would have no 
place in his philosophy for the theory of energetics, 
for everything that man knows is reduced to a part of 
the physical (muscular) organimm. Energy, then, for 
the behaviorist is a secondary consideration, the con-
ditioning of the muscular organization being primary. 
This primary concern must be the type-phenomenon by 
whiCh we characterize a philosophy. 
In the same manner would critical naturalism be 
automatically set aside by strict behaviorism. This 
form of naturalism rejects the qualitative constancy 
of substance and holds that it can only be quantitative. 
"In order that such a version of science shall yield 
a naturalistic philosophy, it is necessary to show that 
nature so construed coincides with knowable reality. 
This conclusion may be arrived at in one or both of two 
ways. It may be argued that the ultimate qualitative 
terms of experience are somehow physical, or a~ any 
rate such as to permit of being explained only in terms 
of physical theories; or it may be argued that physical 
theories are the only verifiable, and 50 the only valid, 
theories. In other words, the priority of physical 
science may be argued from the nature ot fact or from 
the nature of method. The for.mer of these motives is 
represented by ~ensationalism,'and the latter by 'ex-
perimentalism.,·22 It would seem, fram this brief pre-
sentation, that critical naturalism would be the philo-
sophical outcome of behaviorism. But the behaviorist 
can only know nature as it becames a part of his muscu-
lar organism through his responses to stimuli. To 
talk about energy in matter and prior to matter would 
be too speculative and metaphysical for the behavior-
ist. He is satisfied in dealing with muscles and 
glands, as one moulds clay, and brushes aside every 
other explanation of human activity. If there is 
nothing else to human behavior but manipulation of 
muscles and glands (without mind, spirit, or nervous 
energy), how can we arrive at any different theory of 
the nature that is external to us? 
Watson in his system of behaviorism is not so 
modest as Lashley. In his definition he claims the 
Whole field of human activity. That certainly implies 
a theory concerning man's knowledge of reality. He 
goes further and repudiates philosophy. Now it is com-
monly accepted that the most presumptuous system of 
philosophy is that which denies that we can know any-
thing about reality. The implication is that one must 
know a great deal about reality to be able so to limit 
it in man's thinking. Behaviorism claims to be able to 
analyze all of man's relations and to predict the re-
sponses of the human organism, as you would predict the 
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action of your automobile when you feed it gas and oil 
and apply electricity. The basis ot that claim is a 
mechanistic philosophy. McDougall says that most be-
. haviorists were mechanists first and behaviorists sec-
ondari ly only.23 "Behavi orism is the consequence," he 
says, "of carrying the mechanizing tendency in psy-
chology to its logical conclusion, and indeed to a 
point some distance beyond its logical conclusion."24 
AS a further support of this position the behavior-
ist has called in a theory of evolution that is both 
materialistic and mechanistic. "Through the process 
of evolution," says Watson, "human beings have put on 
sense organs--specialized areas where special types 
of stimuli are most effective--such as the eye, the 
ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin and semi-circular 
canals. To these must be added the whole muscular 
system, both the striped muscles ~d the unstriped 
muscles. The muscles are thus not only organs of re-
sponse--they are sense organs as well.,,25 This sounds 
very much as if watson is holding to the theory of evo-
lution that is most convenient for his scheme. In the 
li~~t of his doctrine of behaviorism it would seem that 
his theory is a mixture of Lamarck's inheritance of 
acquired characters and Darwin's natural selection. He 
has nothing to say about causes and so his view appears 
to be Darwinian. He speaks of inheritance of physical 
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characteristics, though he does not show that acquired 
physical characteristics are inherited. He speaks of 
the child of a musician who gives promise of becoming a 
great pianist. It is not the child's talent for music 
that he has inherited from his father, but his long 
tapering fingers that make it easy for him to handle 
the key board. The fact that he has such fingers leads 
the fond parent to gi ve him special attenti on and the 
very best training, until he becomes a greater musician 
than his father. Now the behaviorist is not interested 
primarily in the biological or philosophical question 
of where the father got his long tapering fingers. Our 
inference would be that he got them from his father, 
and he from his father, and so on back until we would 
have to come to some stimulus that would call forth a 
reaction that would necessitate the elongation of the 
fingers. 
But Watson gives us another illustration of a 
father Who is ambitious that his child shall became a 
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great musician, but the child has short stubby fingers. 
Not to be outdone by such a difficulty the father has 
a piano built to fit the boy's hands. With such a per-
fect physical fit the boy is ready to thrill the world 
with his musical genius. This is another of Watson's 
f.anciful pictures, but it serves to indicate where his 
thinking would lead us in philosophy. If it is merely 
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a matter of the length of the fingers and long musical 
fingers are acquired through a process of evolution, 
why wouldn't the lad develop long fi.ngers through a 
process of reaching for the key board of a piano that 
is built for long fingers? But if the piano must be 
built to fit the size of the boy's fingers surely 
physical characters cannot be acquired, and so Lamarck's 
theory of the inheritance of acquired physical char-
acters must be rejected. The only other theory of 
evolution that harmonizes with the above statement of 
Watson is Darwinism. my philosophy that is based upon 
that view must be mechanistic. 
What then is the type of philosophy to which be-
haviorism leads? We have eliminated Pluralism, Ideal-
ism and Personalism because the behaviorist eliminates 
mind from his thinking. As stated above, the strict 
behaviorist disclaims having any philosophy at all, but 
we need not tarry with that, for the mere fact that he 
denies having a philosophy and rearranges the fields of 
knowledge to sui t hi s scheme is prima faci e proof that 
he has a rather distinct form of philosophy. In the 
light of the above discussion I believe we can see that 
it is a monistic and mechanistic materialism. Amore 
dogmatic or closed system of philosophy 1s difficult to 
conceive. But it is characteristic of behaviorism to 
be dogmatic, and its tendency is toward a closed system. 
43 
It leaves the universe a hopeless problem, worse than 
Haeokel's riddle. It leaves the problem of man un-
solved as to origins and future. Indeed it solves the 
problem of man by denying that there is a problem. 
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CHAPTER III 
LOGICAL IMPLICArIONS 
Logic is the science ot thought. It is the field 
of organized knowledge that revolves about the principles 
and conditions of correot thinking. It is thus "reflect-
ive thinking about thought." It is a branoh of philosophy 
that pervades all fields of thought. It is the science 
which controls all the sciences. Consoiously or uncon-
sciously, intentionally or unintentionally, we use logic 
every day in every form of study. Its plaoe in psychol-
ogy and philosophy is oentral and of exoeeding importanoe. 
Since psyohology deals with behavior, mind and oonsoious-
ness it is patent that it inoludes thinking, the realm 
of logio. And sinoe behaviorism is oonoerned with the 
behavior of the entire human organism it is evident that 
it inoludes thinking. So there is much that psychology 
and logio have in oommon, and there is naturally 
same overlapping. Yet there is a marked distinction be-
tween the two fields, chiefly in method and aim. Psy-
chology uses the method of observation and experimenta-
tion, and seeks to give a description and explanation of 
its data. To this extent it is like biology and chemis-
try. Yet it must also reflect upon the results of its 
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observations and experiments. Logic is rather analytic 
in examining thought, wnerever found, to determine the 
form and principles of 'valid thinking.' Psychology 
studies the brain and neural processes involved in 
t~inking, while logic studies the principles of think-
ing with a view to improving it. These principles are 
established and recognized as standards of thinking and 
ali of us desire to measure up to them. Logic does not 
deal with the capacities of man for thought save to 
train and sharpen them. 
Logic has ever been regarded as one of the fields 
of philosophy along with ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics 
and the theory of knowledge. Its importance has grown 
and its value has become felt to such an extent that it 
has assumed almost a determinative place in philosophy. 
Certain forms of logic lead to certain types of philosophy. 
Indeed it has beoome a field of scienoe to itself with its 
own subject matter. "It is interested in the laws of 
thought, the nature of proof, the rules of evidence; it 
desires to see how knowledge is built up and how the parts 
of knowledge depend upon one another."l Its relation to 
ps~chology and philosophy is so intimate that it is worth 
while and well within the province of this thesis to ask 
what effect the conclusions of behaviorism will have upon 
the prinoiples of logic. 
I. Thought. 
Thinking has been defined as problem solving. Dew-
ey2 sees four different ways in which the terms thought 
and thinking are employed. There is first the broad 
use, designating everything that comes to mind. To 
think of a thing is just to be conscious of it in any 
way. Then there is a restricted use in which whatever 
is presented directly through the senses is excluded. 
Then there is a third meaning that is limited to beliefs 
that rest upon some kind of evidence. In cases where 
the ground, or basis, for beliefs is deliberately 
sought and its adequacy examined the fourth type~ or 
reflective thought, is found. In other words, thought 
is relating ideas in the effort to solve the problems 
in such a way as to lead to the discovery and proof of 
the solution. Such, in general, 1s the definition of 
t~ought that logic offers. 
The behaviorist says that thinking is sub-vocal 
talking. He Madvances the view that what psychologists 
have hitherto called thought is in short nothing but 
talking to ourselves. The evidence for this view 1s ad-
mittedly largely theoretical but it is the one theory so 
far advanced which explains thought in terms of natural 
science. I wish here expressly to affirm that in devel-
oping this view I have never believed that the laryngeal 
movements as such played the predominating role in 
thought. ••• We have all had the proofs before us time 
and again that the larynx can be removed without com-
pletely destroying a person's ability to think. Remov-
~ al of the larynx does destroy articulate speech but it 
does not de stroy whi spered speech. Wh1 spered speech 
(without articulation) depends upon muscular movements 
of the Cheek, tongue, throat and chest--organization 
which, to be sure, has been built up with the use of 
the larynx. but which remains ready to function after 
the larynx has been removed. My theory does hold that 
the muscular habits learned in overt speech are responsi-
ble for implicit or internal speech (thought) • . . 
Again, after our overt speech habits are for.med, we are 
constantly talking to ourselves (thought). New com-
binations occur, new complexities arise, new substitu-
tions take place--for example, where the shrug of the 
shoulders or the movement of any other bodily part 
becomes substituted for a word. Soon any, and every 
bodil~ response may become a word substitute.-3 
watson sees support of his theory in the child's 
behavior. 4 He talks incessantly when alone. Soon so-
ciety restrains his talking aloud, and the overt speech 
dies down to whispered speech, and finally to speech 
behind closed lips (thought). Thinking, then, accord-
ing to the strict behaviorist. is the subvocal use of 
words which have already been babitized. These words 
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are the substitutes for the objects that have stimulat-
ed us, and so we are enabled to carry those objects a-
round with us. We possess these objects (words) as we 
respond to the stimuli that they constitute for us. 
"Verbal, manual and laryngeal activities become organ-
ized together as parts of the total habit system we 
form around each object and situation in the world we' 
live in.-5 And 60 it is evident th~t for the strict 
behaviorist thinking is a matter of the activity of the 
physical organiEm. It is no more, no less. The responses 
of the organism to the stimuli are the effect of the stim-
uli upon the striped or skeletal muscular system, the un-
striped muscular system or the viscera, and the glandu-
lar system. All these systems are active when the or-
ganizm responds to stimuli in what we call talking. When 
a word is substituted for an object it makes an impression 
upon the muscular or glandular syst~ and that impression 
is intensified by repetition. For every object we have 
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a word substitute and so we carry the world around with 
us as an actual part of our bodily organization. The 
organism can manipulate these words in the throat or 
larynx, but it is physical activity and not mental. This 
manipulation is thinking for the extreme behaviorist. If 
we ask him who does the manipulating he answers "the or-
gani sm." If we ask him why this manipulating is done he 
answers that it is because certain stimuli evoke that 
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type of response. If we ask him if there is any design 
or purpose in it his logical answer would be no. It is 
somewhat like spinning a top. There is a stimulus that 
acts as the string to set the top in motion and it con-
tinues in that same kind of motion until the effect of 
the stimulus dies down. 
If the radical behaviorist is right and thinking 
" is no more than such manipulati on· what is the value of 
logic? The implication is that logic can only be the 
study of the manipulation of these muscles to lead to 
better thinking. But there would be no principles to 
guide, for a principle is not an object and so would 
. have no word substi tute and would leave no muscular im-
pression. LOgic then would be a science of physical 
mechanics. Thinking would be problem solving of the 
trial and error type. There is, however, a serious gap 
right here that either behaviorism or behavioristic logic 
would have to fill. It must be proved, and it hasn't 
been done yet! that thought is identical with muscular 
action. It is interesting to talk about the muscles 
that are employed in talking and then to say that think-
ing is the same thing, but saying so does not prove 
that they are identical. What about the man who is 
called on for an exterporaneous speech and as he is 
talking he is thinking ahead of what he is to say next? 
But the behaviorist would say that that is only the evi-
dence of the introspectionist. We will examine the 
logic of such a position later. 
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The question that arises here is, what about the 
words that do not represent objects? Let us take a 
sentence at random fram Watson. -Think what it means 
in the economy of time and ability to callout co-
operation from groups to have word substitutes for ob-
jects cammon to all members.- What .object does 'think' 
represent? Has anyone ever seen the muscles of the 
larynx manipulate the parts of the larynx or the muscles 
that carry the worda of this sentenoe? If one could ob-
serve that manipulation while the organism is thinking 
would he be able from his obserTation to tell what the 
organism is thinking about? Again, what object does 
'what' represent? And what about the word 'means'? Is 
there any meaning other than the object for which the 
word is substituted? Once more, for what object is 
'time' substituted? When that word is brought into 
use by manipulation what does it signify? And so on 
with the other words in this sentence, and it is the 
same with many words in the average conversation or 
paragraph. 
The behaviorist may tell us that the words that 
are not substituted for objects are a part of the or-
ganization of the word substitutes which we use in 
talking about objects. If that be the case then by 
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what rule or process do we choose the organization words 
and use them consistently? It must be rather a chance 
affair, without the guiding of consciousness. It is 
difficult to understand how we could receive such words 
from other persons, since they might not be related to 
any objects. But that brings us to the question of 
reasoning. 
Lashley sees three classes of thought: (1) the 
relatively unordered drift of revery; (2) the repro-
duction of habitized sequences, as in the flow of mem-
orized material; (3). creative thinking, involving a 
problem set and a solution reached. "The third class 
presents the supposedly creative work of consciousness. 
Subjectively, the problem seems to present three phases: 
determination of sequences, conflict of elements of con-
tent, and resolution of the conflict."6 This third 
class is what we ordinarily call reasoning. Lashley's 
definition is a good one. Except for the subtle words 
'supposedly' and 'seems' it may well have come from an 
introspectionist. Indeed he sees that and guards a-
gainst anything but a behaviorist use of his defin-
ition by later making the statement that "the descrip-
tion of a rat opening a problem box is as complete an 
account of the process of thinking as can be given from 
introspective data.·? 
Again the stimulus-response formula comes into play. 
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The behaviorist tells us that so long as there is a 
stimulus just so long is the problem unsolved and the 
reasoning continues. When the stimulus ceases the prob-
lem is then solved and reasoning ceases, just as the 
problem of getting food is solved when the nagging 
stimuli from the stomach have died away. "80 with the 
man's verbal conclusions and judgments. The adjust-
ment is complete--the problem solved for him--as soon 
as he has made a verbal (or other) response which al-
lays, causes to l1e down, intraorganic stimuli impell-
ing him to further verbal activity.a8 But such is not 
the case at all in logic. When one has found the solu-
tion of his problem he finds that one of the greatest 
problems of reasoning lies just ahead, that is the 
proof of his solution. We can not answer this criti-
cism by saying that the quest for the proof is the 
stimulus that is still unsatisfied after the solution 
has been reached. When we reach the solution of a 
problem by reasoning we get the relieved, satisfied 
reaction, but it is usually momentary only. The further 
question of the proof arises at once, to answer the 
hypothetical critic. This is not necessarily a part 
of the intraorganic stimulus, for the organism is often 
satisfied when the solution is reached. The need for 
the proof is not felt until someone asks concerning the 
solution, or unless we are not entirely satisfied. We 
frequently foresee that and acquire the proof before 
the actual stimulus is received. 
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But let us look a bit farther at watson's defin-
ition of solution that is reached by reasoning. If the 
solution is acquired when the intraorganic stimuli die 
down, and such is an indication that the solution has 
been reached, then it may be sometimes the key to the 
problem and sometimes entirely apart from the problem, 
having no connection with it at all. For example, a 
neighbor's boy brings an algebra problem to me to solve. 
Re enlists my sympathy and soon I am interested in the 
problem. I begin to realize that I have forgotten much 
. of the algebra that I once knew, and then there arises 
in me a desire to solve the problem just to show the 
boy and myself that I can do it. Just at this point 
the 'phone rings and my attention is drawn to a golf 
game. The boy with the problem is put aside with the 
promise of help later. A few hours later, the game 
over, my attention returns to the boy. But he tells 
me th~t his father has just worked the problem, and has 
found the solution. That satisfies me, silences the 
intraorganic stimuli, and at once I proceed to forget 
the problem in favor of the evening paper. I did not 
in any sense solve the problem, yet my reaction has 
satisfied Watson' 6 defin! tion of the solution that is 
the object of reasoning. It can thus be seen that 
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reasoning for the behaviori~t is somewh~t mechanical and 
unreliable, determined almost entirely by the condi ti on 
of the physical organism. 
The contribution that behaviorism would make to 
logic on this point would be a very easily attained ob-
jective in reasoning. In fact, to lower it to the plane 
of allaying intraorganic physical stimuli would vitiate 
all principles and standards of reasoning. Vfuen one is 
disturbed with a great problem why not just eat a big 
dinner? .All of us know thd.t a full stomach calls much 
of the blood fram other parts of the body to aid in the 
work of digestion. This automatically diminishes the 
stimuli to thinking. It is difficult to think while the 
stomach is full. This is at least the natural way of 
satisfying physical stimuli, and certainly it would be 
much easier, and often more pleasant, than staying with 
a difficult problem until it is solved. 
There are two psychological phases of thinking and 
reasoning that we may bring in for a brief examination 
in relating behavioristic psychology to logic. They 
are memory and imagination. The behaviorist says that 
memory is merely a matter of organization. We meet peo-
ple, get acquainted with them, learn to know them and 
in thi.s way they become a part of our organization. We 
are daily being organized by the people we me et, the 
books we read and the events that happen to us. In 
, 
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learning sometimes the organization is manual, sometimes 
it is verbal, and sometimes it is visceral. Usually it 
is a combination of all three. "By 'nlemory,' then, we 
mean nothing except the fact that when we meet a stim-
ulus again after an absence, we do the old habitual 
thing th~t we learned to do when we were in the presence 
of that stimulus in the first place. n9 Thus the behav-
iorist contends that after a manual act has been learned 
and formed into a habit and then put aside for a defin-
ite period of disuse, some loss in efficiency occurB, 
but the loss usually is not total. , The amount of 10sB 
depends upon the length of the period of disuse, and 
upon the individual. "SO, instead of speaking of mem-
ory, the behaviorist speaks of the retention of a given 
habit in terms of how much skill has been retained and 
how much has been lost in the period of no practice. We 
do not need the term 'memory,' shot through as it is 
with all kinds of philosophical and subjective conno-
tations."lO 
In like manner does the behaviorist explain mental 
imagery on the basis of physical reaction. If a small 
part of the retina is stimulated and then shaded the 
person will often behave for a good while after as 
though the retina were still being stimulated. The ef-
fect is either a positive after-image or a negative 
after-image. "The two effects can be made to alternate 
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by alternately stimulating the eye vnth diffused white 
light and then removing the stimulus. Under suitable 
conditions these effects may persist for a long time but 
they gradually diminish both in intensity and saturation. 
They are capable, however, of being revived to an in-
tense degree many hours after they have disappeared if 
the eye is adapted to darkness. They may have quite a 
deal to do with the character of dreams and so-called 
'mental imagery,' and may play an important part in 
hallucinatory experience. nll He goes on to remind us that 
the eye is always under stimulation, carried on some-
times by lens a~justment and change in convergence and 
divergence of the eye-ball; and sometimes by centrifu-
. gal neural impulses reaching the eye from the central 
nervous system. Thus the retina, a delicately suscepti-
ble sense organ, is subject to stimUlation from within 
as well as outward stimUlation of light. Pathological 
cases demonstrate this. The retina is probably over-
active so far as these internal changes are concerned 
and the subjeet appears to be reacting to visual ob-
jects to which other persons present do not react. 
Extreme pathological cases do not have to be called 
in. Since the behaviorist has to accept the testimony 
of the subject 1n those cases, for the observer cannot 
see what the subject claims to Bee and 60 the behavior-
i st says it i B an apparent reacti on, why not take an av-
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erage man's word for what he sees? Here is the case of 
a man sitting down and recalling a funny incident that 
happened ten years ago. He says that he can see it all 
as plainly as if it were happening at that moment. As 
he visualizes it he breaks out into a hearty laugh. That 
is as clear a case of imagery as the pathological cases. 
But the behaviorist does not admit it. If he does it 
is an admission of mental imagery with slightly differ-
ent terminology. 
With no memory and no imagery, save as they are 
physically retained and recalled, reasoning is robbed 
of two of its livest factors. Here is a problem con-
cerning a child. As I look at him I recall certain ex-
periences in my childhood days. I claim to see certain 
scenes, buildings, trees, children that were common to 
me in those days but that have long since changed. Then 
as I look into this young ter's face I imagine him as 
a grown man in an office managing a business enterprise. 
That is my teptimony of a part of my reasoning process 
as this boy stands before me. But the behaviorist says, 
"Pooh, pooh, you are an introspectionist. There is 
nothing in that for me to observe and therefore there 
is nothing to it." And so if we follow strict behav-
iorism out to its logical conclusion we will have nothing 
left of reasoning processes but a juggling of word sub-
stitutes, as stimuli arise, in an imageless, memoryless, 
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proofless procession of physical reactions. 
The behaviorist's doctrine of word substitutes for 
objects gives rise to the question of percepts and con-
cepts. A percept 1s the interpretation we make of a 
sensory stimulus. When we see a tree the word substi-
tute for that tree that we take away with us is a per-
cept. But we see scores of trees every day and so when 
we use the word it does not represent any particular 
tree but trees 1n general or a type tree. This general 
type word (or idea) is what the logician calls a concept. 
It is the object of awareness which is not directly con-
nected ~ith the stimulation of the sense organs. and 
which is under the individual's control so far as hav-
ing them or not having them is concerned. 12 Now the be-
haviorist says that a word is a substitute for an object 
and that it becomes a part of our muscular organization 
so that we can manipulate it. We can manipulate words 
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with other words. but behaviorism does not take into 
account any ability of interpreting the stimuli which 
these words represent. They are built in responses and 
may be called forth again by other stimuli. Each word 
is substituted for an object. When we use the word tree, 
which tree does it represent? I have seen a number of 
kinds of trees. Some of them are known for their foli-
age, same for their blossoms, others for their fruit, 
others for their value in providing shade, some for their 
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sap, and still others for their grain of wood. And so 
when I use the word tree I may refer to anyone or all 
of these types, or to a general type that includes them 
and others that I have not yet seen. This is accom-
plished by classification, but who makes the classes? 
As we receive these stimuli is there same mechanical 
device for pigeonholing them? If so we may have per-
cepts and concepts. Can we learn of such an inner 
process by observation? 
I I. Deducti on . 
There are in the main two types of logic, deductive 
and inducti ve. Deducti ve lo·gi c accept s a gi Yen general 
proposition, or assumption, and from it, together with 
a less general or a particular proposition, draws a 
conclusion. It is reasoning from general principles to 
particular applications. Since behaviorism, with one 
fell sweep, has brushed aside all the general princi-
ples and conclusions of psychology and philosophy of 
prior and contemporaneous times, there are left only 
two general propositions (bases) from which to deduce 
particular conclusions. One is the group of defin-
itions that are proposed and the other is the general 
assumptions which are characteristic of this school 
of psychology. Let us look at these two classes of de-
ductive thinking as behaviorism affects them. 
Logic cannot go far without definition. It is 
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basic in all our thinking. We have been saying that 
definition is a summary in which ideas are ordered in 
relation to one another. For strict behaviorism, how-
ever. definition must be something else, for it does not 
recognize ideas. It would have to be something like a 
manipulation or arrangement of words to explain reactions 
and stimuli. Definition is largely ~ a matter of classi-
fication. There are at least two effects that the con-
clusions of behaviorism will produce upon the problem 
of definition in logic. In the first place all defin-
ition will have to be made in terms of the physical or-
ganism, particularly the muscular and glandular systems. 
For example, watson defines language as a "manipulative 
habit.- Then he enlarges upon that by saying that "down 
in the throat at the level of the Adam's apple we have 
a simple little instrument called the larynx or 'voice 
box.' It is a tube made up largely of cartilege across 
which two very simple membranes are stretched (membran-
ous glottis), the edges of which for.m the vocal cords. 
Instead of manipulating this quite pril~tive instrument 
with our hands, we manipulate it with its attached mus-
cles as we expel the air from our lunge. ••• We 
tighten the vocal cords, change the width of the open-
ing between them as we tune the strings of the violin 
by turning the pegs. The air is expelled fram the lungs 
through the opening between the vocal cords. This causes 
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them to vibrate and to give out a sound. We call this 
the voice. But as we make this sound another group of 
muscles changes the shape of the throat, still another 
Bet changes the position of the tongue, another the 
position of the teeth, and still another the position 
of the lips. The mouth cavi ty above the larynx and the 
visceral cavities below constantly alter 1n size and in 
shape so as to change the volume of the sound, the char-
acter of the sound (timbre), and the pitch of the sound. 
All of these responses are called into action the first 
time the baby cries."13 That is language and that is 
all that language is, says the behaviorist. It is a 
very good physiological definition, but it is given to 
cover all phases of language. Such a restriction of 
definition would be destructive of philosophy. ~ues­
tiona of ontology, cosmology, teleology and such would 
be ruthlessly pushed aside, for they cannot be reduced 
to the stimulus--reaponse formula. 
Another effect upon definition would be to explain 
one response or stimulus by substituting another term 
and so to reason in a circle. Thus "the behaviorist 
claims that there is a response to every effective stim-
ulus and that the response is immediate. By effective 
stimulus we mean that it must be strong enough to over-
came the normal resistance to the passage of the sensory 
impulse from sense organs to musclea. w14 Just when io 
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the resistance normal? 
Another example of such shifting of ter.ms in defin-
ition is seen in the behaviorist's way of disposing of 
instincts. He insists that there are no instincts. But 
he sees a number ~f 'unlearned' responses, such as 
sneezing, hiccoughing, crying, smiling, grasping, the 
fear response, and same others. Two of these, grasp-
ing and fear, he treats very much in the same manner as 
others would in calling them instincts. 
The other general basis of the behaviorist's de-
ductive reasoning is his group of general assumptions. 
Perhaps his basal assumption is that nothing exists be-
yond the observing apparatus of the scientist. Right 
proudly does he boast that the scientific attitude is 
that of the observer, and so he qualifies himself as a 
scientist. He observes the child, watches him grow in 
behavior from simple to complex, and draws the conclus-
ion that the child that he sees, the organism, is all 
the child that there is. Logic calls that begging the 
question, reasoning in a circle. For an example, let 
us return once more to the explanation that the be-
haviorist gives of thinking. On the stimulus-response 
platform he explains that it is subvocal speech. wat-
son15 gives as part of his evidence an experiment with 
a man who was asked to think aloud in solving a problem. 
He observes that the man's behavior in reacting with 
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words is quite similar to the rat in the maze. He start-
ed out slowly, then went hurriedly on a trial solution, 
stopped, came back to the starting point and began all 
over again. The rat worked with his feet, his whole 
body being actively engaged in the project. The man 
worked with words, his entire body being implicitly in-
volved in the action. Now there you are. The premise 
is that man is only physical, just like a rat or any 
other animal. Then you observe the rat solve a prob-
lem by trial and error. Then you hear a man think 
aloud, using words, in solving a problem by trial and 
error. Finally you watch the man as he solves a prob-
lem without thinking aloud. Now you draw your conclus-
ion that when he 10 thinking silently he is talking to 
himself, subvocally. And that is all that thinking is. 
"If then," says Watson, "you grant that you have the 
whole story of thinking when he thinks aloud, why make 
a mystery out of it when he thinks to himself?" ~uite 
so. If you grant that you have the whole story when he 
is thinking aloud you grant the main premise of behav-
iorism and there is no need of entering into the ques-
tion of silent thinking. But suppose we do not grant 
this premise? The only thing that will be left of Wat-
son's evidence will be a good instance of reasoning in 
a circle. 
This premise of behaviorism includes the general 
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assumption that there is no conscious element in be-
havior. That rules out the will, emotions and intellect. 
Yet when we read Watson's explanation of language he 
calls on us to initiate conscious behavior. In explain-
ing the mechaniEm of the 'voice box' he says, "When you 
think of it, ~ ~ think of some simple reed instru-
.16 ment • N ow how can a physi cal me chani EIJl try to . . 
think? Thinking, says the behavioriBt, can only come 
aa a response to stimuli. If these stimuli come from 
within and we calIon the mechanism to initiate the 
stimulus and bring about the reaction there m~t be 
some intelligence or power that controls the mechanism 
or organism. Even a player piano doesn't Bend forth 
music unless some power that 1s not the piano peddles 
it or turns on the switch. If, on the other hand, these 
stimuli came from without suppose some of us who read 
do not think of this simple reed instrument? Then the 
behavi ori st would say that the stimulus was not "strong 
enough to overcome the normal resistance to the passage 
of the sensory impulse fram sense organs to muscles." 
But, even with this flagrant bit of begging the question, 
he has called on us to help clear the way of resistance 
that the desired reaction might be stimulated. 
In another connection Watson almost turns intro-
spectionist in describing the process of building in 
manipulative habits on the basis of unlearned responses. 
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Here is a behaviorist describing his own behavior (with-
in the organism). He says, "We watch our chance and 
build upon these."l? He means that he controls his 
physical action. He is guilty here of two errors in 
logic. In the first place he employs the contrary of 
his premise to prove his premise. In the second place 
he uses a type of evidence, introspective, but he re-
jects it when used by others. 
Another phase of this general premise is the be-
haviorist's assumption that by reducing the physical to 
the minimum he can show that there is no mental. Thus 
he observes the behavior of the infant. The baby CWl-
. not tell us what he is thinking and so the behaviorist 
concludes that he is not thinking and that he has no 
capacity for thinking. He has no emotions, no will, 
and no intellect. He has only the capacity for making 
noise and that develops into the ability to talk. This 
line of reasoning overlooks two rather important facts. 
One is that the mind grows as well as the body. Since 
the behaviorist accepts the law of physical growth he 
has no right to reject the law of mental growth. The 
other fact is that no one has yet discovered how much 
thinking ~r what we have been calling thought) the 
baby does. In other words it is a question of how much 
potential behavior there is in the infant. It is the 
fallacy of assuming that any phenomenon can be explained 
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away by reducing it to a minimum. 
One other error in the logic of behaviorism may 
be mentioned briefly. It is what the logician calls 
argumentum ad ignorantiam. Thus the behaviorist says 
to the introspective psychologist, "I have rejected all 
conscious phenomena,now you prove to me that there is 
conscious activity._18 One of the behaviorist's main 
arguments is an attack on subjective psychology. 
III. Induction. 
Modern science greatly strengthens its method by 
using both deduction and induction. Two good methods 
correctly used will add strength to any system. Two 
good methods incorrectly used will accentuate the weak-
ness of any system. Behaviorism uses both deduction and 
induction. If behaviorism is true the behavioristic use 
of both methods must be correct and applicable in any 
field of study. Let us see where the behaviorist's use 
of induction leads. 
Induction is reasoning from particulars to a gen-
eral statement or law. It is the method by which we 
generalize concerning more cases than we examine. The 
greater the number of cases examined the more trustworthy 
will the conclusion be. A conclusion is not reliable that 
is based on just one or two experiments unless it is a 
crucial experiment. Indeed it has always been a question 
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whether certainty can be gained through induction. 
Aristotle said that it couldn't, unless it be complete 
induction and, ~f course, that is enumeration and not 
induction at all. Logicians now do not claim that in-
duction gives certainty. They say it gives probabil-
ity only. The degree 6f certainty is heightened by the 
number of cases examined and the thoroughness of the 
examination. On the contrary, "false generalization 
due to haste and lack of critical examination is the 
constant dan@er which threatens induction. M19 
This is the danger that faces behavioriEm when it 
seeks the mental in the physical and, failing to find 
it, generalizes that there is no mental. It is the 
error of going into a closed room and after a brief ex-
amination of the contents of the room concluding that 
what is there exists and what isn't there does not ex-
ist. As well maya behaviorist train his microscope 
upon a drop of water and failing to see stars and plan-
ets conclude that astronomers are all wrong, and that 
there are no planets. Or the astronomer may conclude 
that since he does not see microbes through his tele-
scope there are no microbes. The behaviorist shuts 
himself in a roam where he can only observe the outward 
'behavior of children and concludes that what he does not 
observe does not exist. 
It is after some such fashion of reasoning that the 
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behaviorist draws the conclusion that thinking is noth-
ing but subvocal talking. When Titchener raised the 
question aome years ago of how the behaviorist can know 
that there is any such process as thinking going on, 
since he cannot directly observe it, Watson answered 
that it can only be done by a log! cal inference. "In 
those cases where the response to the stimulus is not 
immediate but where it finally occurs in some form of 
expli ci t verbal or manual behavior, it is safe to say 
that something does go on, and that something is surely 
not different in essence from that which goes on when 
his behavior ia explicit. n2O Here is the behaviorist's 
inductive reasoning laid bare. With a bold "it is safe 
to say· he draws a conclusion that must revolutionize 
psychology, philosophy and logic. If it is safe to 
draw such important conclusions on such flimsy evidence 
we may as well throwaway our logic. Why isn't it just 
as safe (or safer) to say that When one is talking in 
his effort to solve a problem he is merely expressing a 
process that is going on in his mind, and that Vlhen he 
does not talk the process is going on without expression? 
As further support of his induction Watson tells of 
handing a friend a cigarette case that could only be op-
ened by pressing a secret spring. After fumbling around 
for a long while he is put in a room by himself and told 
to come out when he opens it. After a while he comes 
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out smiling and with the case opened. "Since there are 
no marks of violence on the case, the behaviorist, uti1-
izing logic, has a right to assume that the subject "Con-
tinued to work at the problem as he had been trained to 
work at such problems and that his behavior in the empty 
room was essentially the same as that exhibited by him 
when he was under direct observation •• 21 Now, wha.t is 
the logic that he utilizes? It is this, he assumes one 
thing and then from a rather superficial exper±ment he 
infers what he has assumed. 
In similar strain he employs the evidence of a deaf, 
dumb and blind woman who, after being taught a hand and 
finger language. was observed in her sleep talking to 
herself using the finger language with grec..t rapidity.22 
Once again he generalizes on one case and says that all 
thinking is implicit langua~ activity, sensori-motor 
~ 
ill character. Someone has told the parable of a family 
of mice that lived inside a piano. They saw the ham-
mers rise and strike the wires and they heard music. 
They generalized and said that music is nothing but a 
mechanism of hammers and wires. But one day a philosoph-
ical mouse went outside the piano and observed the musi-
cian fingering the keyboard and he concluded, logically, 
that the music was caused by some person striking the 
keys, which caused the hammers to rise up and strike 
the wires and start vibrations that we call music. Now 
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the behaviorist observes the mechanics of the piano but 
shuts hi s eyes to the one si tting on the bench playing. 
That brings up the question of causality that, if 
it is not properly answered, may easily give rise to a 
false generalization. One form of the error in .this con-
nection has been called post hoc ergo propter hoc. That 
is sequence is accepted as a cause. Here is a stimulus 
followed by a response, ergo, the response was caused 
by that stimulus. A behaviorist tells of a dog rush-
ing violently upon a child, barking loudly, and pounc-
ing upon him and throwing him down. The child cries. 
The behaviorist says that the loud noise was the stim-
ulus that produced the crying response. He then gen-
eralizes and says that loud noise is the only stiluulus 
that always produces the fear response in infants. 
This is very interestingly demonstrated in the w~ 
the behaviorist explains attention. He prefers to use 
the word selection, for he says it does not imply con-
sciousness. Then he observes that a person responds 
to a blinding flash of li ght by jumping and screaming. 
A more moderate flash of light would call forth a more 
moderate response. Then he generalizes that the intensi-
ty, extensity, duration and movement of stimuli are fac-
tore in selective behavior. If there is any further dif-
ference it is due to the structure of the organism. "3irds 
fly, fi shes swim, snakes crawl, and men walk because of 
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their respective structural characteristics. Obviously 
the stimuli responsible for these activities are select-
ed by receptors structurally adapted for such functions.,,23 
This Bame line of argument he vall follow in explaining 
differences in behavior among men. Two men affected by 
the same Bti~ulus respond differently. The difference 
must be due to the difference in the structure of the 
two organisms. As a rubber ball will rebound farther 
from a tennis racquet tha~ from a tennis net, so the 
cause of selective behavior is the stimulus plus the 
condition of the organism at the time, because the stim-
ulus cames before the response. 
Our conclusion of the whole matter is that behavior-
ism does not have a constructive contribution to make to 
logic. If behaviorism is true thinking and reasoning are 
entirely outside the realm of logic. In fact there is no 
thinking 1n terms of logic. Yet the behaviorist used in-
duction and deduction in developing his system. He useB 
them and then abolishes them. In fact, he abolishes them 
in his use of them. Even if we accept the behaviorist's 
use of induction and deduction, we would only have a sys-
tem of convenience. we could reason as the rad1c~l .be­
haviorists do and prove any theory. ·Behaviorism destroys 
all standards and principles in logic. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Epistemology is one of the most difficult of the 
philosophic studies. That it rightly comes in the gen-
eral realm of philosophy nearly all agree. Yet Durant, 
in his recent and very popular book "The story of Phil-
osophy,- very curtly dismisses the entire subject. He 
turns it over to psychology without any reservations 
whatsoever. In this he is rather an exception, perhaps 
yielding to a desire to attract popular interest to 
philosophy. To say the least, for philosophy or psy-
chology, it is a perplexing subject. 
It takes as its subject a study of the nature and 
conditions of human knowledge. The function of psy-
chology in epistemology may be distinguished as the 
study of the knowing mind, or the knowing powers of the 
organism (structural psychology); or the study of the 
development of cognition (genetic psychology); or an 
analysis of the part knowledge plays in the human life 
(functional ·psychology). The function of philosophy in 
epistemology is to reflect upon the origin, v&lidlty and 
limits of knowledge. It is readily Been that the two 
phases of the problem of knowledge intermingle and over-
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lap, and that a deviation from the generally accepted 
principles and methods of one must naturally affect the 
other. Thus our interest here is in the problem of a 
behavioristic epistemology. That there is such a prob-
lem goes without saying. 
Epistemology assumes the possession of knowledge, 
as do all the sciences. Then it turns about and exam-
ines the basic el~ents of knowledge, as none of the 
other sciences do: what is knowledge? whence does it 
come? how do we get it? and how may we be sure of its 
validity and certainty after we have it? These are 
some of the questions involved in the general theory 
of knowledge. The sciences assume that we have knowl-
edge and that what we get is reliable if it meets cer-
tain standard tests, without going into the generally 
basic theory of those tests. Psychology, being part 
science and part philosophy, is involved in this prob-
lem. And behaviorism, claiming to be only science and 
yet involving itself through its negations in philosophy, 
brings up certain very interesting questions. Some of 
these .we are to consider. 
Heretofore epistemology has been dealt with as a 
reflecti ve ·study. But ill the language of behavi ori sm it 
must be a mani pulative study. The organism mani pulates 
its store of word substitutes around the general problem. 
of knowledge. When the intraorganic stimuli that raised 
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or sustain the problem die away the response of manipu-
lation ceases and the result is behaviorism's contribu-
tion to epistemology. 
I. The nature of truth. 
There is nothing directly stated in the behavior-
istic syptem concerning the existence or sUbsistence of 
truth as such, but there is much implied. As we come to 
the conclusions which these implications lead us to we 
may test the main theories concerning the nature of truth, 
which have been advanced by the philosophers through the 
ages, by them. Realism is the theory that champions the 
objective existence of truth independent of human experi-
ence. It is just the opposite of Idealism, which claims 
that truth is a quality of the ideas of the mind and 
that apart from these ideas truth does not exist. The 
for.mer is based upon philosophic dualism, while the lat-
ter is largely monistic. As was seen in Chapter II 
strict behaviorism excludes both. It is conceivable 
that the behaviorist might hold a type of monistic 
realism. That is, he would accept the fact of the ob-
jective existence of truth if you mean that it exists 
as physical objects. But all realists would insist that 
there must be something more than the objects as such, 
there must be quality or relations of some sort which 
could be appropriated by t~e mind yet whiCh would exist 
80 
independently of the mind. No form of Idealism could be 
tolerated by strict behaviorism, for the latter excludes 
all ideas when it excludes the mind and ccnscious activity. 
Absolutism holds that truth exists before we ac-
quire it, that it always has existed and will continue 
to exist whether we ever possess it or not. We gain pos-
session of it gradually. Then there is the absolute-rela-
tive theory, which says that truth is both absolute and 
relative. It is absolute in the sense that it is inde-
pendent of human apprehension. It is relative to the 
extent that the human mind grasps it, and to the extent 
that every object presents an appearance that differs ac-
cording to the differences in the constitutions of the 
percipients and according to the relations in which the 
object stands to other objects. Behaviorism would say 
that we cannot say anything one way or another about 
absolute truth. It is useless and meaningless specula-
tion. We can only know or know about objects that stim-
ulate us and to which we react. And so the behaviorist 
would reject absolute truth in all forms. He might hold 
to a theory of relative truth, but not the absolute-rela-
tive theory. , 
The copy theory holds that what we get is a copy 
of realities. Our ideas of objects or events are copies 
of those objects or events. This, however, would imply 
an absolute existence of truth, which the behaviorist 
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would rej e ct. He would agree that the words whi ch he 
uses as substitutes for objects are indicators of the 
objects, but he would deny that there are such events 
as ideas concerning the objects, and would thus deny 
the copy theory. The representative view is that our 
ideas represent objects in their true relations. As 
these ideas re-present the objects to us we come to un-
derstand the objects in their constitution and in their 
relations more fully. That is truth. Again the behav-
iorist would say that if you mean that the reactions 
represent the stimuli then he would accept this theory. 
But he would deny that he gets any ideas or mental im-
ages of the objects. And so truth would be representa-
ti va to him only as he manipulates hi s "voice-box" in 
the repetition of word substitutes for objects. 
The correspondence theory is that our ideas corre-
spond to truth. The ideas that we have of objects cor-
respond to those objects in their true relations. This, 
however, implies some sort of absolute existence of truth, 
and it would call too much for ideas for the behaviorist. 
The intuitive theory is that we have truth in our minds 
independent of experience. It is axiomistic with us. 
This the behaviorist would reject outright for he says 
that human behavior is largely learned and that we do 
not have a mind to intuit truth. Then there is the theory 
that truth is what God or an absolute mind accepts. As 
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will be shown in the last chapter the extreme behav-
iorist must logically deny the existence of God. Cer-
tainly, if we have no evidence of finite mind we can 
get no evidence of an infinite mind. 
The pragmatists say that truth is the workability 
of ideas, that it is a quality of propositions. "True 
ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate. cor-
roborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we 
cannot. That is the practical difference it makes to 
us to have true ideas; that therefore is the meaning of 
truth, for it is all that truth is known as. The truth 
of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. 
Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made 
true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a pro-
cess, the process namely of its verifying itself, its 
verification. Its validity is the process of its valida-
ti on."l 
Pragmatism is a very practical and workable theory 
of truth. Since it is the aim of the behaviorists to 
make psychology simple and practical, non-speculative 
and non-metaphysical, it would seem that pragmatism and 
behaviorism would go hand-in-hand. And they would but 
for one small obstacle, namely that behaviorism can't 
support any system that builds upon ideas. Now, if we 
could change the termi nology of pragmati am wi thout de-
stroying the principle of it we might effect an agreement 
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between the two. Suppose we say that truth is the work-
ability or agreement of unstriped muscular responses? 
Is that pragmatism without ideas? We might at least 
call it behavioristic pragmatism. 
We would have to come to some such definition of 
truth or permit behaviorism to rule out all theories of 
knowladge, for everything must be explained in terms of 
stimulus and response. Accepting this definition for 
the time being let us first see how it affects the postu-
lates of knowledge. Sellars2 gives a partial list of 
four general postulates: (1) that knowledge does occur; 
(2) that the world has a determinate nature which can 
be comprehended, partially at least, in thought; (3) 
that the world is essentially the same for all observ-
ers; (4) that individuals can cmmnunicate and can mean 
essentially the same by their terms. The behaviorist 
would accept the first one without hesitation. For he 
is anything but an agnostic. He is too dogmatic for 
that. Furthermore he would not step into such a philosoph-
ical difficulty as to claim to know enough to deny knowl-
edge. He would accept the second postulate, but he would 
insist that we comprehend through visceral response rather 
than through thought. The third he would accept, provided 
all observers are behaviorists. Certain1y the world is 
not the same for introspectionists and behaviorists. The 
fourth he would accept and more. He would say that all 
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individuals can be trained or conditioned from infanoy 
to communicate with the same terms and contents. 
It may be objected that this is making too much 
change in these postulates. But they must be modified 
to suit our definition or be rejected entirely. But 
that brings up the problem of meaning, a fundamental, as 
well as a difficult, problem in psychology and philosophy. 
Meaning is the content that we put into terms, or that 
terms have for us. Words change their meaning as peo-
pIe change their use of them. Take, for example, the 
English word 'let.' It means, signifies, exactly the 
opposite of its original meaning. We talk about the 
meaning of an event or a word because it carries with 
it certain signs that point to other events and words, 
or because it produces certain results, or necessitates 
certain types of action. The behaviorist says that mean-
ing is a useless term. It is another one of those ter.ms 
that have been used so long by introspective and function-
al psychologists that they cannot be made to fit into the 
behaviorist's scheme. And yet a compromise is possible 
on the behaviorist's conditions. "If you are willing," 
says Watson, -to agree that meaning is just a way of 
saying that out of all the ways the individual has of 
reacting to this object, at anyone time he reacts in 
only one of these ways, then I find no quarrel with mean-
ing."3 In another place he says, "from the behavi ori st' s 
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point of view the problem of 'meaning' is a pure ab-
straction. It never arises in the scientific obeerva-
tion of behavior. We watch what the animal or human be-
ing is doing. He 'means' what he does ... 4 If it never 
arises in the observation of behavior it is because he 
assumes it or speaks of it in other terms. When the be-
haviorist talks of predicting behavior he is projecting 
or extending the meaning of responses in relation to 
stimuli. But the general effe-c.t of Watson's definition 
of meaning, if it be accepted in full, is to further 
mechanize any theory of knowledge that the behaviorist 
may have. 
II. How knowledge is" acquired. 
Sel1ars5 suggests that the claim to acquire or at-
tain true knowledge implies four things: (1) "the abi1-
ity to obtain significant facts--that is, facts which 
are capable of revealing something about objects; (2) 
the right to use past experience so far as it is rele-
vant; (3) the value of mental operations like analysis 
and construction as means for deciphering the structure 
or constitution of objects; and (4) the assumption that 
the world which we claim to know has a pattern or con-
stitution which is in some measure reproduced in facts 
and grasped in ideas." The se are the impli cati ons of 
knowledge. The facts of science must have significanoe 
86 
as to the structure of nature. To get knowledge is to 
obtain these facts, and then classify and interpret 
them--discern their meaning. 
As there are various theories concerning the nature 
of truth so there are different theories as to how knowl-
edge is acquired. We may well examine them and see which 
comes nearest harmonizing with the conclusions of behav-
iorism. The first to be noticed is rationalism, or dog-
matism as Kant ter.med it. It places implicit confidence 
in the ability of the reason to fathom the nature of in-
dependent reality. It asks no mandate from some higher 
authority to prosecute its ends. What it regards as 
necessary and universal is necessary and universal. It 
assumes that reason is a peculiar function equal to its 
task of knowing the universe. The difficulty is that 
reason is so often unsuccessful. The problem of knowl-
edge is closely connected with the problem of error and 
ignorance. Reason alone is not always capable of mak-
ing and verifying the distinction. 
Empiricism holds that all knowledge comes from ex-
perience. It denies the existence of any a priori con-
stituents in knowledge, maintaining that at first the 
mind is a blank tablet or clean slate, upon whi ch ex-
perience must inscribe all the characters. These in-
scriptions come one by one, and what seems to be a ne-
cessary connection appears so only from the habit we 
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have for.med by associating certain elements together. In 
recent times there has developed a more flexible empir-
icism, 1n which the experience does not have to come in 
a piecemeal fashion, or as an accidental accumulation 
of psychic elements. Thus William James called his 
philosophy a "radical empiricism," distinguishing it 
from traditional empiricism by the fact that the latter 
"has always shown a tendency to do away wi th the con-
ne~tions of things and to insist most on the disjunc-
tions," while his own empiricism "does full justice to 
conjunctive relations, without, however, treating them 
as rationalism always tends to treat them, as being 
true in some supernal way, as if the unity of things 
and their variety belonged to different orders of truth 
and validity altogether." John Dewey calls his an 
"immediate empiricism." It "postulates that things-
anything, everything, in the ordinary or nontechnical 
use of the term tthing'--are what they are experienced 
as. Hence, if one wishes to describe anything truly, 
his task is to tell what it is experienced as being." 
Experience is thus a method, the method, of acquiring 
knowledge. Knowled~ is itself a form of experience. 
The rationalist objects that he can gain knowledge 
through his reason independent of experience. 6 
Kant sought a modification and reconciliation of 
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rationalism and empiricism. He adopted the basic view 
that whatever is given in experience is purely mental in 
nature, or, at least that it is constituted materially 
of sensations. Objects must be related in thought. 
Knowled ge is impossible without a thinking mind, that 
is, without understanding or intelligence. Reason is 
not only receptive, but active. Intuition is perceptu-
al, understanding conceptual. Knowledge consists in 
synthetic judgments a priori. tlAnalytic judgments are 
always a priori; we know .without going to experience 
that all extended things are extended; such judgments 
are based on the princi ples of identity and contradic-
tion. But they do not add to our knowledge. Synthetic 
judgments a posteriori add to our knowledge, but are 
not sure; the knowledge they yield is vague, uncertain, 
problematic. We demand apodictic certainty in our 
sciences, and such certainty is possible only in syn-
thetic judgments a priori. lI ? And so empiricism and 
rationalism may yet come together in the attainment and 
systematization of knowledge. 
Another attitude tow~rd the problem of attainment 
of knowledge is that of the skeptic. He either says that 
there is no knowledge, or if there is we cannot know of 
it or acquire it. He usually does not deny the exist-
ence of knowledge as a fact of experience, but he ques-
tions seriously most theories of knowledge. He has a 
theory of his own about knowledge, which is mainly a 
denial of other theories. 
Now, what assistance can behaviorism render in 
solving the problem of how knowledge is acquired? As 
89 
to the four things that Sellars says are requisite to the 
acquirement of knowledge strict behaviorism would have 
the following to say: (1) we have the ability to re-
ceive stimuli from objects and to carry those obj ects, 
or their equivalents in word substitutes, around with 
us; (2) we have the right to use past experience, which 
is merely a manipulation of conditioned responses which 
have become habitized or made prominent through fre-
quency or recency of repetition; (3) mental operations 
have no value in analysis or anything else, but the vis-
ceral and glandular systeII13 re spond to the stimuli , ;of 
the various elements of the objects and to the intra-
organic stimuli in such a way as to lead to a decipher-
ing of the structure of obj ects; (4) we can make no as-
sumption concerning the pattern of the world, we can 
only react to the stimuli which come to us from the 
world as it is and as it affects us. And so the be-
haviorist would claim that we can get knowledge without 
the use of a mind through physical responses and re-
tention of those responses by the organism. 
As to the theories stated above, strict behavior-
ism would reject rationalism, for it does not r ecognize 
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reason apart from stimuli and response. Kant's modi-
fication of rationalimn and empiricism would likewise 
be set aside by radical behaviorism, for it knows no 
compromise on the question of mental phenomena. The 
behaviorist may be a skeptic to the extent of doubt-
ing, even rejecting, all theories of knowledge except 
the one which builds upon his platform, but he would 
not be a skeptic in the sense of denying that we can 
get knowledge. He says that we get knowledge concern-
ing the objects to which the organism reacts, but that 
it does not come through any faculty such as mind, or 
reason, or consciousness. Knowledge has been defined 
. as the apprehension of objects. The behaviorist would 
say that, accepting that definition on the basis of the 
stimulus-response formula (that apprehension is a func-
tion of the physical organism), he gains knowledge. 
When the intraorganic stimuli, that center in the ap-
prehension of the object, die down the knowledge is 
acquired. These stimuli naturally, or mechanically, 
arise as the object, through its word substitutes, is 
being organized into the unstriped muscular system of 
the body. Then the recall of that bit of knowledge is 
a manipulative response to eane other stimulus, the 
manipulation being vocal or sub-vocal speech. 
So it would seem that the behaviorist would follow 
out his conclusions in epistemology to empiricism. Of 
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course it would be empiricism with his modifications, 
he would be a behavioristic empiricist. He agrees 
with the traditional view that the mind at birth is a 
blank page or clean slate upon which the characters 
are to be written--only he would say it is the physi-
cal organism, and not a mind, that is at birth uncon-
ditioned but ready to be conditioned by the stimuli 
that it meets. Experience, for behaviorism, is only 
reaction to stimuli, it cannot involve any mental in-
terpretation or classification of those stimuli or 
responses. That opp~ses James' primary claim that cog-
nition is a function of consciousness. The behavior-
ist would say that it is a manipulative function of the 
viscera and glands. 
This position also eliminates the element of self-
transcendence in getting knowledge. The physical or-
ganism has no power to transcend itself, it can only 
receive the stimuli that come to it though they may 
come from ever so great a distance. And so when my 
friend fram interior Brazil tells me of his home, his 
work and conditions there, I claim to react by seeing 
mental pictures as he describes them, though I have 
actually never been to Brazil. Then, three months 
later, I sit down and give myself over for a few min-
utes to an imaginary visit with my friend at his home 
in Brazil. Now the behaviorist says that I am merely 
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manipulating the word substitutes for those objects 
which he gave me. But I would remind him that there is 
no new stimulus now calling forth that manipulation, 
and that those words stimulated me through my ears, and 
not through my eyes, but that now I can see the adobe 
home and the orange trees around it. But that is in-
trospection and he dismisses that as unworthy evidence. 
If there is no self-transcendence one wonders if 
the behaviorist can formulate a working hypothesis con-
cerning something that has not been discovered. His 
reasoning consists of manipulation of word substitutes. 
In order for this thinkin c to take the form of an hy-
pothesis his manipulation must take the form of con-
jecture concerning the relations which hold between 
facts or lie back of them. The behaviorist would claim 
that he does that in his trial-and-error thinking. It 
may be granted that hypothesis is trial-and-error think-
ing, but it must be admitted that it is a rather ad-
vanced and highly developed form of such thinking. That 
strict behaviorism does not lead to such a type of think-
ing as we call scientific hypothesis we call Watson's 
language in to show. He is discussing how the 'new' 
comes into being, how we get new verbal crec::l.tions. "The 
answer is," he says, "that we get them by manipulating 
word s , shifting them about until a ~ew pattern is hit 
upon. . .. How do you suppose Pat~u builds a new gown? 
93 
Has he any 'picture in his mind' of what the gown is to 
look like when it is finished? He has not, or he would 
not waste his time making it up; he would make a rough 
sketch of it or he would tell his assistant how to make 
°t "8 1 • This type of hypothesis which he eays cannot 
take place has happened many times, according to his 
own conditions. A good example is seen in the discov-
ery of the planet Neptune. Uranus was observed to be 
out of position according to previous calculations. Adams 
in England and Leverrier in France then proposed the hy-
pothesis of another planet affecting Uranus. They pro-
ceeded to chart the course of t~ e planet they deduced 
(the thing that Watson said Patou would have done had 
he worked according to a picture i n his mind), and on 
the basis of their calculations they found that it 
should appear at a certain time and in a certain posi-
tion. At that time Galle, of Berlin, trained his tele-
scope and for the first time observed the planet which 
they named Neptune. It was in almost exactly the pl~ce 
indicated in the chart. The behavioriRtic astronomer 
would have looked first at this star and then at that 
unti 1 accidentally he mi [ht have observed the new plan-
et, but he would never have charted its course before-
hand. 
To what extent, then, can the strict behaviorist 
acquire knowledge? A. O. Lovejoy says that "if per-
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ceiving and thinking are what Watson says they are, and 
nothing more, no organism can ever know either what it 
is doing or what object evokes its response; and there-
fore no psychological investigator can possess such 
knowledge. The only consistent behaviorist would be 
one who knew nothing whatever-who at no moment of hi 6 
existence could do more than relax or contract his mus-
cles, without being aware that he was doing so. And to 
maintain even a decent semblance of consistency the be-
haviorist should at least refrain from professing to 
know anything ... 9 Perhaps Lovej oy is a bi t posi ti ve, 
but there is ground for hie general claim. It is simply 
a matter of requiring of the behaviorist what he requires 
of others. 
We must conclude, then, that epistemology for the 
behaviorist is just another phase of the behavior of the 
physical organism. Truth is the agreement of extraorgan-
ic and intraorganic stimuli with their responses. When 
this agreement is reached knowledge has been attained 
and the oTganism ceases to function in that particular 
connection. Knowledge is thus conditioned upon the 
physiological changes of the body. 
· . 
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CHAPTER V 
:E:rHICAL IJlPLICATIONS 
Ethios is that branoh of philosophy which takes as 
its field the study of morality. It studies human con-
duot with referenoe to moral rightness or wrongness. Mor-
al conduct is the voluntary action of a person in so far 
as that action is amenable to a standard of obligation 
imposed on him by society. The plan of life derived 
from that standard of obligation is always first adopt-
ed by the individual from the cammunity in which he is 
reared, but it may later be modified by his intelligence, 
emotions, will and personal experience. As to what there 
is in the standard of obligation that makes the conduct 
that measures up to it moral and the conduct that is 
contrary to it immoral, we shall have to determine by 
examining into the various ethical theories. 
Ethics is a branch of philosophy separate and dis-
tinot to itself, yet it has im~ortant connections with 
all other branches. It is a study of values based on 
experienoe rath er thart metaphysios. Everett points out 
that "ethics precedes and leads up to metaphysics rather 
than follows its completion. The central reason for be-
lieving in the logical priority of ethics is that all 
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those values with which ethics has to do are developed 
in the historical life of man, and are disclosed to 
bur knowledge by methods of observation and analysis 
that are essentially scientific. Metaphysics has never 
discovered a new type of moral value.- l To say the 
least, ethics is in its own rights in the study of 
moral values and, while it may draw assistance from 
metaphysics, it relies largely upon the experiential 
method. Therefore psychology should be of material 
help to ethics. Psychology Should do more than explain 
mind in the sense in which other sciences explain their 
material, for it deals with material that has in some 
sense at least a philosophic content. it should leave 
room for anthropocentric values, for human ideals and 
aspirations, and it should present its material in 
such a way as to identify its principles with some 
qualitative elements in our experience. Whether or 
not behavioristic psychology does that we may see from 
our study. Watson regards ethics at present as tend-
ing toward "experimental ethics based entirely upon 
behavioristic methods. n2 It is to be remembered that 
there may be a deal of difference between experiential 
and experimental ethics. 
I. Behaviorism and the problem of moral value. 
A value is a prinoiple of preference. A moral value 
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is a positive principle of preference that looks to the 
good, the welfare of the community. An immoral value 
is negative in the sense that it tends toward evil and 
is undersirable for the community, not in the sense that 
it negates value. We live in a world of values: economic, 
bodily, recreational, aS6ociational, character, aesthetic, 
intellectual and religious. To live the virtuous life 
we must choose aright among these values, whiCh, said 
Plato, we must know not only singly, but in the rela-
tions which they sustain to each other and to the pur-
pose of life as a whole. Morality is to be identified 
with the recognized virtues such as temperance, truth-
fulness, justice, benevolence, etc. These moral values 
are distinguishable only by conscious beings, or, we 
may say, to beings who exhibit the equivalent of con-
scious activity. The good is presented to us in a 
satisfying manner, we are pleased with it. Evil is 
presented to us in a way that does not satisfy, we fear 
and resist it. 
That b+ings us to the question of what is good. 
What is the summuc bonum which stands as the good of 
all human endeavor? Is it to be found in some end to 
be attained? Or is it some primary element in the idea 
of duty that is dictated by some universal law of right? 
The theologists in ethics affirm that the rightness of 
an act depends upon the intention and the effects which 
, 
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the act produoes. Acts are objectively right when they 
result in the betterment of sooiety, wrong when they 
produce social misery. Formalism in ethio. discovers 
the rightness of acts in the will, the desire, regard-
less of the results or ends achieved. Values are thus 
. determined by the relative strength and rectitude of 
the desires, by the degree of ~~yalty to a command or 
law of unconditioned authority. 
In the difference of attitudes toward this uni-
versal law, or standard of obligation, we may discern 
the characteristic distinctions of some of the leading 
ethical theories. It marks the distinction between 
individualism and over-individualimn which will be 
noted later in this chapter, and which was the differ-
ence in ethics between Socrates and the Sophists. Plato 
taught that this immutable essence of morality is the 
eternal supreme "form of the good,- the supreme authori-
ty in a hierarchy of ideal essences. Aristotle said 
that morality consists in certain obligations imposed 
by the desire to secure certain ends. Christian theology 
says it is God's law of righteousness. Ethical intui-
tionism finds a "faculty" of conscience in every man; a 
faculty which may become atrophied in those who refuse 
to give it play, but which is an always present element 
in the original equipment of faoulties possessed by every 
man. 
~l 
Ethical rationalism, as championed by Kant, ascribes 
to pure reason a constant and invariable mandatory activ-
ity, whioh operates in every individual to the produotion 
of a reoognized obligation to do certain things and not 
to do certain other things, simply beoause this doing 
or not doing is pure reasonableness. This was Kant's 
conoeption of the moral law, his oategorical impera-
tive. He formulated it in the prinoiple "Aot only on 
that maxim whereby tuou canst at the same time will 
that it should beoome a universal law." It has its 
seat and origin in a priori reason. 
I~ behaviorism interested in the problem of moral 
value? Watson says he is not. In desoribing his method 
of discovering the personality of an individual he 
says, "the behaviorist is naturally not interested in 
his morals, except as a soientist; in faot he doesn't 
care what kind of man he is."3 But this is an extreme 
position, and is perhaps due to Watson's enthusiastic 
desire to be striotly scientifio and to hold within the 
area of behavioristic psychology. But he has already 
defined behaviorism in such terms as to include all 
human behavior, and has sallied forth to define ethios 
in ter.ms of behaviorism--that it is experimental ethics 
based entirely upon behavioristic methods. Putting 
these two statements together we oan certainly draw the 
conclusion that there is no place in extreme behaviorism 
~ . 
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for a system of moral values. 
II. Hedonism and perfection. 
Hedonism roots the universal, unvarying form of 
morality in the desire of every individual to secure 
pleasure. It gets its name fram the doctrine of pleas-
Pb~ c. ur~ being J'iUY7 . hedone. It was at first egoistic 
but gradually became altruistic. In modern form it is 
best represented by Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Paley, Ben-
tham, and Mill. Locke claimed that it is -Man's proper 
business to seek Happiness and avoid misery.- Mill 
set forth a theory of universal utilitarianism based 
upon the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth. And so the 
scope of hedonism has gradually widened until it has in-
cluded all the ideal satisfactions of human life, even 
those states of spiritual satisfaction which attend the 
noblest and most unselfish activities. 
Just here the distinction between psychological 
and ethical hedonism should be pointed out. It is a 
distinction between motivation and valuation. The 
motive in the pursuit of pleasure is the psychological 
aspect of hedonism, while the value is ethical. The 
psychological view is prospective, emphasizing the 
motive, that which is desired. The ethical view is 
retrospective, emphasizing the value, that which is de-
sirable. For the former pleasure is the motive of every 
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act. while for the latter the value of conduot is ulti-
mately measured by the production of pleasure. Now, if 
the behaviorist should recognize any motive power at 
all in human activity it would seem that he would accept 
psychological hedonism. If pleasure is the satisfaction 
of intraorganic stimuli, satisfaction being the act of 
naturally allaying those stimuli, then for the behav-
iorist pleasure is the motive of every act. It is that 
which moves the workma~ to do just enough work to get 
his week's pay. But the behaviorist would not be an 
ethical hedonist, for he does not recognize any prinoi-
pIe of preference which would make one pleasure more 
desirable than another, and another most desirable. 
True it is that one pleasure will more nearly sati sfy 
the intraorganic stimuli than another, but there is no 
mechanism in the bodily system that classifies stimuli 
and responses into more desirable and less desirable. 
Any such function or faculty would come very near be-
ing conscious activity. 
The ethi cal theory of perfection holds that the 
end in view in all conduct, the highest good, is the 
development of inherent capacities, a process of self-
realization. For the behaviorist these capacities can 
only be realized in behavior, and so perfection is a 
perfection of behavior. In this case the standard is 
entirely physical. However, behaviorism will have to 
surrender all claims to the perfection theory for it re-
quires a faculty of knowing the capacities of the organ-
ism and the stimuli to be chosen which will best de-
velop his capacities toward perfection, according to 
strict behaviorism, but it would not be the result of 
a plan of perfection worked out beforehand, it would 
only be a matter of chance, samething of the trial-
and-error Bort, and that is not ethical perfection. 
III. Behavioristic virtue. 
In judging ethical conduct we take into considera-
tion both the subjective and the objective elements. Con-
duct is sometimes valued according to the intentions, de-
sires, will that form the subjective aspect of canduct __ 
formalism. But more usually we place a value upon con-
duct according to the effects or results accomplished--
teleology. In behaviorism, while there may be a sub-
jective element consisting of intraorganic stimuli and 
responses, the only element that we can know and appre-
ciate is the teleological. So for the radical behavior-
ist there ie no for.maliem in conduct. V~at then is the 
ethical virtue of behaviorism? It is moral training, 
not training according to a system of moral values, but 
according to the reactions of the largest number in the 
group in which he is being trained. The behaviorist says 
that if we will take people while they are infants we can 
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condition them, or train them, according to any standard 
that is set up. So if the standard is lofty the conduct, 
which will be the result of the conditioning, will be 
good. This training is the virtue of behavioristic ethics. 
The only fly in the ointment is the question of the stand-
ard. If a behaviorist could not erect a high standard 
for himself it is difficult to see how he could set up 
such a standard for others. Furthermore, if a behavior-
ist cannot desire or will to act according to a certain 
standard save as he responds to stimuli how can he de-
sire or will that the child shall respond in a certain 
way which is in accordance with the standard, and not in 
another way which is contrary to the standard? But 
these are problems that the behaviorist doesn't recog-
nize. 
It was seen in Chapter II that the conclusions of 
behaviorism lead to a rigorous mechanistic world-view. 
The effect of such a view is that it commits us to a 
status quo, without any opportunity for real progress. 
The behaviorist talks about conditioning children to re-
spond in such a way that their behavior will be standard, 
that is good and commendable. But that standard would 
have to be a mere summary of the stimuli and responses 
that have constituted our behavior. And these stimuli 
that we have r e sponded to came down to us from the gener-
ation before us, and so on back. Where would any new, or 
106 
better, standard begin? It couldn't begin without a cre-
ative intelligence to initiate it. 
The general eth! cal conclusi on then would be indi-
vidualism rather than over-individualism. The standard 
for each person would be the harmony or agreement of his 
reactions to the stimuli that come to him from the group 
or that arise within his organism. The stimuli of social 
environment, or of law, would awaken certain intraorgan-
ic stimuli. When he does, or says, or says sub-vocally, 
the thing that causes those intraorganic stimuli to die 
away he has satisfied himself and has met all the stand-
ard that he knows anything about. This follows directly 
from watson 1 s defi ni ti on of 'soluti on ,. quoted in Chap-
ter III. 
IV. The problem of free.dom. 
The controversy over the problem of freedom centers 
chiefly in two theories, determinism and indeterminism. 
Determini~ is the view that all events in man's mental 
and moral life, as all events in the physical world, 
must be thought of as antecedently conditioned, of be-
ing the necessary sequence of preceding events in whi ch 
they have their origin. This means that in conduct any 
act, whether good or bad, is the necessary result of the 
combined forces of the inner nature and environment of 
the one performing the act. Indeterminism is the view 
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that there are events in the mental and moral life which 
cannot be explained as the necessary result of preceding 
condi tions or relations. "These events spring immediate-
ly and spontaneously from the will, and appear in human 
experience as a strictly new creation. u4 It holds that 
the will is exempt from the principle of causation, that 
it is not determined by external compulsion, nor by in-
ternal compulsion; but that man has the natural ability 
to choose good acts, and that he may be influenced by 
ethical motives in making his choices. 
Between the two theories the strict behaviorist 
would have to take the deterministic view. His plat-
form eliminates indeterminism, for when you eliminate 
conscious activity you also eliminate will, which is 
one phase of conscious activity. Furthermore. the aim 
of behaviorism is to be able to predict the response 
when the stimulus is known. That implies that the re-
sponse 1s automatic, predetermined by conditioning, and 
that no element of contrary choice enters into the be-
havior. At least it implies that when one responds in 
a certain way to a stimulus he will always respond in 
the same way to that stimulus, under similar conditions, 
unless he is conditioned by some external power to do 
otherwi se. 
The radical behaviorist insists that nearly all 
human behavior is learned, there being only a few physi-
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cal responses which he terms 'unlearned behavior.' on 
the basio of which he builds in the conditioned responses. 
The baby holds the bottle in his hands because they are 
structurally more suitable for that than his feet. He 
le~rne to speak English because that is the language he 
hears his parents use. As he grows he learns to play 
the piano beC4use his fingers are long and tapering and 
his parents require him to practise and be conditioned 
as a pianist. If he ever learns any other language be-
sides English it will be bec'use it is in the college 
or university curriculum, or because he meets certain 
foreigners, or becau~e he travels in a foreign country. 
But man exhibits no instincts, no intuitive behavior, 
no conscience, no consci ousness what soever. That is 
extreme determinism. Take, for example, watson's ex-
planation of habit formation. He says, "Some stimulus 
in the outside environment or in the inside environment 
s·ets the indi vidual moving. He may move in many ways, 
do many hundreds of things, before he blots out stimu-
lus A or moves himself beyond its range. If, when he 
gets into the same situation again he can accomplish 
the one or the other of these results more rapidly and 
with fewer movements, then VIe say he has learned or has 
formed a habit. "5 Now, if we can control the stimulus 
(which watson claims to do in his experiments with ba-
bies) we can control beh&vior. Man's conduct, then, is 
determined by the stimuli of his environment or by 
previous conditions, stimuli and reactions. 
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As pointed out above, the strict behaviorist dis-
claims any interest in man's morals or moral conduct. 
Now, since extreme behaviorism would make of man a mere 
automaton, acting only as he is stimulated or condition-
ed to act, what would be the result upon the question of 
responsibility and punishment for crime in a social or-
der? There would no long~r be any emphasis upon "crim-
inal intent." It would not be fair to punish the crim-
inal, for he would say that he was conditioned by previous 
stimuli to respond in the way he did, and when the stim-
ulus arose he had no power of choice, it was merely his 
organism reacting. Then if he is not responsible what 
right would society have to punish him, even by putting 
him in an asylum? Then those who were responsible for 
the environment, or the stimuli, under which the crimin-
al acted should be held accountable. But they responded 
to certain stimuli to which they had been conditioned, 
there was no Bort of "criminal intent" on their part. 
And so our investigation would go on back in an infin-
ite regress. We would find no one responsible or ac-
countable. Then we may as well do away with the courts 
and concentrate upon conditioning children so that they 
will not commit crime. But what organism is there that 
can rise above its environment, eject all element of 
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crime and evil, and, vrithout any power of choice or judg-
ment or conscience, condition children to live accord-
ing to a new standard? 
Extreme behaviorism, being hedonistic and determin-
istic, would nullify all moral codes and vitiate justice. 
Experimental and behavioristic ethics would be a matter 
of trial-and-error conduct without moral values of any 
sort. What advantage would there be in such ethics and 
where would it lead us? Perhaps it would be more con-
sistent to say that extreme behavioris~ would give us 
no ethics at all. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS 
Religion is a recognition of a ·power. or powers, 
upon whom we recognize our dependence and with whom we 
seek to establish and maintain a happy relationship. It 
is indissolubly related to philosophy for it is our ef-
fort to adjust all our theories of reality and ultimate 
cause on the basis of our belief in God. Philosophy 
seeks to unify the conclusions of all the sciences on 
the basis of same common principle or type-phenomenon. 
Religion seeks to use the conclusions of science and 
philosophy in personal relationship with the primal 
cause, the uncaused cause. Philosophy is the effort 
to unify knowledge, while religion is the effort or de-
sire to utilize knowledge to satisfy the desires of the 
soul. 
In a similar way religion is related to psychology. 
It takes the conclusions of psychology and goes beyond 
them. It is possible for the two to be so understood as 
to make of psychology a support of religion. But often 
psychology is so treated as to be antagonistic to some 
of the fundamental claims of religion. The word "psychic" 
comes from the old Greek wordfd;tj7 , which meant mind or 
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soul, and so psychology would be the science or study of 
the mind or soul. And so religion and psychology seem 
to have much in common. Psychology studies the mind or 
soul, while religion seeks with the mind or soul (or 
mind and soul) to acquire knowledge of God, holding 
that in the acquisition of that knowledge we gain the 
greatest happiness and blessing. Jesus, the founder of 
the greatest religion that the world has yet known, 
said, "this· is life eternal that they might know thee, 
the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast 
sent. "1 
This etymological definition of psychology was 
adopted before behavioriam came upon the field. But 
because of its denial of the mind and consciousness we 
are interested in studying the effect its conclusions 
will have upon religion. Religion is so intimately re-
lated to philosophy and psychology that it is deemed 
fitting to let the closing chapter of t~4s thesis deal 
with it in a general way in connection with the claims 
of behavioristic psychology. OUr study will be grouped 
around three main problems: the soul, God, and immor-
tali ty. 
I. The soul. 
Is there a soul in man? If so What is the nature 
of it, of What stuff is it made? What are its functions? 
l~ 
These que stions, in brief, constitute the problem of the 
soul. We shall not go into the questions that religion 
per se is interested in, such as the redemption, the lib-
eration, the growth, the sancti f ication of the soul, and 
such like. Our aim is to see if behavioristic psychol-
ogy, assuming that its conclusions are valid, can affect 
the general claims of religion concerning the soul. Re-
ligion claims th~t man has a soul, that it is of spirit 
nature clothed for a period of time with a physical body, 
and that its functions are to worship and serve God its 
creator and to enter into happy fellowship with man its 
fellow creature. 
The attitude of the physical sciences has been in 
the main ~ leave the question of a soul alone. Physi-
cal science deals with the phenomena that can be handled 
with its apparatus and makes no claims concerning the 
realm into which its apparatus oannot reach. It leaves 
that to philosophy and religion. Occasionally we find 
a scientist who makes bold statements concerning the 
soul or other questions in religion, but he does so as 
a philosopher or religionist and not as a scientist. 
Biology does not discover a soul, but neither does it 
affi~ or deny the existence of a soul. And so with 
physiology, chemistry, physios and others. The prob-
lem of the soul is outside their realm. 
Some types of non-behavioristio psychology have 
ll? 
assumed the existence of a soul as in same way identi-
fiAd with or wrapped up in consciousness. As such they 
have dealt with its functions or faculties as threefold: 
intellect or reason, emotions or feeling, and will. Re-
ligion says that faith is an act of consciousness, but 
that it cannot be restricted to intellect, or will, or 
emotions as such. When religion goes on into the rea~ 
of faith psychology has assumed the attitude of non-
committal. True it is that some psychologists have ad-
vanced into the field of religion, some being favorable 
to the claims of religion while others are antagonistic. 
But they do so as psychological religionists and not as 
strict psychologists. Indeed there has grown up in the 
past quarter of a century quite a field of study called 
I 
the psychology of religion. It should be clearly un-
derstood that religion is an open field for study. "To 
popular thought, the extension of scientific inquiry 
into the field of religious experience has sometimes 
seemed strange and even menacing. But the objection 
that religion is too sacred for investigation falsely 
assumes that the understanding of the facts of the re-
ligious life will destroy that life itself. . . • When 
one enters the precinct of religion one does not leave 
the realm of law and order ... 2 The fi eld is open to in-
vestigation, but Bcience must remember that when it cames 
to facts, or phenomena, that are beyond the reach of its 
l~ 
apparatus it is not entitled to dogmatize upon them. 
And in the main that has been the attitude of science. 
However, when psychology and religion meet in a common 
study where psychological method and religious appre-
ciation harmonize much may be accomplished. This is 
not a contradiction of the statement made above, for 
the religious appreciation carries beyond the psychologi-
cal method in the study of religious phenomena. 
Philosophy in general has recognized the existence 
of the Boul, though there has been same disagreement as 
to its functions and immort~lity. There have been some 
materialistic and mechanistic philosophies that have 
denied the existence of the soul, but they have been 
more the exception than the rule. Philosophy has gen-
I 
erally regarded the soul as the main mark distinguish-
ing man from lower animals. 
The extreme behaviorist is enough philosopher to 
have a theory concerning the soul and religion. The 
fact that his theory is mostly a negation doesn't alter 
the fact that he has a theory. The wide sweep that the 
behaviorist makes in defining his field makes it impera-
tive that we shall examine his conclusions and state-
ments as they reach over into the realm of religion. In 
discussing what he thinks is the religious background 
of current introspective psychology watson says that peo-
ple have always been controlled by fear stimuli and that 
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religion has made use of that by imposing certain con-
cepts on its adherents fram infancy on. Then he says 
that "One eXW'Ilple of such a concept i 6 that there i6 a. 
fearsome God and that every individual has a soul whiCh 
is separate and distinct from the body. This soul 1s 
really a part of the supreme being. This concept has 
led to the philosophical platform called 'dualism." All 
psychology except behaviorism is dualistic. That is to 
say we have both a mind (soul) and a body .•. No one 
has ever touched a SOUl, or has seen one in a test tube, 
or has in any way come into relationship with it as he 
has with the other objects of his daily experience.·3 
This is the natural and the logical position for 
strict behaviorism to take since it has taken in his 
, 
scope of study all human activity and at the same time 
has limited itself to the objective observation method. 
It seems illogical that such a self-styled 'scientist' 
should assume the whole realm of human action and then 
limit himself to one method of approach. However, hav-
ing proclaimed such a platform he does well to hold to 
it and in holding to it he is logical. But he does not 
always do so. Let us see. Religion is largely a mat-
ter of conviction, sometimes it becomes prejudice. Wat-
son admitted in handling the question of thinking that 
since he could not observe a man manipulating certain 
organs wi'thin the body he had to infer that such was the 
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case. In other words, in this instance the radical be-
haviorist must go beyond his objective method and draw 
a conclusion that is not supported by observation. But 
in the question of the soul he rules the whole matter 
aside by saying that it is a plain assumption, unprov-
able and unapproachable. 4 The first inference, concern-
ing thinking, is illogical while the second, concerning 
the soul, is logical according to his major premise or 
assumption. But why should he be guilty of such a fla-
grant distortion of logic? It looks very much like 
prejudice. He is ready and willing to use inference in 
supporting the hypothesis that thinking 1s Bub-vocal 
speech, but he rants and raves if someone else wants to 
use inference in supporting the position that religion 
is based upon the real existence of a soul in man. 
II. God. 
The second problem with which we are faced in ex-
amining the religious implications of behaviorism is 
the question of the existence and the character of God 
and possible relations that man may have with him or 
that he may sustain with the universe. Here again the 
general attitude of physical science has been one of 
non-committal. Physical scientists have often committed 
themselves as in favor of, and some as opposed to, the 
idea of a supre~e being who rules over the affairs of 
men and the universe. But physical science as a study 
121 
does not assume the problem of proving or disproving 
the existence of God. Philosophy, however, takes the 
conclusions of science and draws certain inferences con-
cerning God. 
One of these conclusions has been based upon the 
evidence of design in man and nature. Man's body is 
designed perfectly, showing supernatural intelligence 
in the designer. In like manner nature outside man 
shows marks of design that indicate supreme intelligence. 
Law and order are seen everywhere. The atom is main-
tained in order like a miniature solar system with its 
electrons whirling about a nucleus that is the center 
of gravity. The stars and planets are held in their 
orbits and systems by laws that seem immutable. There 
must be a God to design and sustatn such law and order. 
Not all philosophers have agreed in such a conclusion, 
but it is in the province of philosophy. 
A similar conclusion has been based upon the evi-
dence of purpose in man and nature, teleology. Scien-
tists and philosophers have discovered a purpose for 
nearly ever,ything that they have discovered. Certain 
habits of lower animal life serve tbe purposes of higher 
animal life. Animate and inanimate nature may be used 
by man to accomplish certain ends. Whither does it all 
lead? Phi 10 sophy and reli gi on have said that there is 
a higfter purpose that is in the mind of God. 
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In l1ke manner the argument from "universal phe-
nomenon" has been used. Wherever man has been found he 
has been found to have an idea of God. Certain philoso-
phers have said that this indicates the existence of 
God. Man everywhere has the idea of a perfect being. 
Existence is a necessary attribute of perfect being. 
Therefore God must exist. Others have rejected this 
argument, saying that we might have an idea of a per-
fect island but that wouldn't prove that such an is-
land exists. And the first group have answered that 
such is not a universal phenomenon. And so the argu-
ment has been used and criticised through the centuries. 
It is not necessar.y to go further with philosophical 
proofs of the existence of God. This is enough to show how 
philosophy approaches the qu estion. Religion uses philosoph-
ical concepts and conclusions and goes beyond them to build 
personal relationships. The Chriotian religion argues the 
existence of God on the basis of revelation and experience. 
The Chri st1an says that he has contact v.,1. th God and knows 
that he exi sts. 
The strict behaviorist would reject the evidence that 
the philosopher, or religionist, or Christian brings on 
the ground that it is introspective. my argument to suit 
him must meet the test of the objective method. Philosophy 
and religion say that God is spirit. The r adical behav-
i ori st says, "I can't observe, touch or see or hear, a 
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spirit and my assumption is that what cannot be ob-
served by the physical senses does not exist, therefore 
God does not exist." At least he would say that the 
idea of God is a worthless Bnd out of date concept. 
In like manner would the behaviorist have to re-
ject the religious doctrine of revelation. Everything 
must accord with the stimulus-response formula. Man 
can only respond with the physical organism, he has no 
eoul, and so if there were a God man could not receive 
his revelation. True, God might express his revelation 
in physica l stimuli, but even then man would never know 
that it came from a spirit. 
The only stimulus that Watson recognizes in re-
ligion 1s that of fear. It is the only basis of the 
relations between God and man, according to hie treat-
ment. In "' fact it is the only support that religion has. 
Re says, "If the fear element were dropped out of any 
religion, that religion could not long survive."O But 
Watson has already said that the fear response is "un-
learned behavior." Then religion doesn't build it in 
when it makes its appeal to man. Watson would probably 
answer that religion builds upon it. The answer is 
found at least in the Christian religion, which claims 
to build upon the foundation of love, saying that "per-
fect love casts out fear. n6 
Religion says that man enters into relati ons with 
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God through faith and trust. The extreme behaviorist 
would say that he knows nothing of such acts for they 
cannot be observed. Man doesn't exercise faith with his 
viscera or glands and so, as all behavior must be ex-
pressed in terms of such responses, there can be no 
such human action as faith. There is, then, no way for 
the strict behaviorist to enter into relations with, or 
to observe, God. The only conclusion is that he must 
be an atheist, or an infidel. 
III. Immortality. 
The third and final problem to be considered here 
is immortality. It may be just briefly stated. Will 
man's life continue beyond the grave? Once more science 
has nothing in the way of explanation or proof to offer. 
Philosophy can offer only speculation. It is a matter 
left entirely to religi ous belief and conviction. 
The ethic~l and religious values that grow out of 
the doctrine of immortality are of far-reaching imp~rtance. 
It is difficult to overestimate them. Thoughts that cen-
ter in the world to come have permeated the ethical stand-
ards of man the world over and are constantly influencing 
his conduct. 
Since extreme behaviorism rules out the existence 
of the soul it is evident without further argument that 
he rejects all forms of belief in immortality. He would 
have to come to such a position from two angles. In 
the first place he denies that there is anything to man 
but the physical organism and we know that at death the 
body disintegrates. In the second place he denies that 
we can know anything except by outward observation and 
the only thing that we can observe of a man after hie 
death is the decaying of his body. 
In religion, then, the conclusions of behaviorism 
lead to a denial of the soul, of the existence of God, 
and of the immortality of man. But it is to be noted 
that the extreme behaviorist disposes of the problems 
of religion by arbitrarily brushing them aside. He 
would take religion from man and of fer him nothing in 
its place. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have given my interpretation of the philosophical 
implications of behavioristic psychology. Many will not 
agree with me in all of my conclusions, but that is not 
to be expected. If I have succeeded in pointing out the 
general philosophical tendencies of behavioriam I have 
achieved, in part at least, the end that I set out to 
reach. Perhaps more emphasis has been placed upon the 
position of the extreme behaviorist than might have been 
expected, but it has seemed to me that the extreme posi-
tion indicates the logical tendency of the essential ten-
ets of behaviorism. These lead to a mechanistic and ma-
terialistic philosophy; a system of paradoxes and falla-
cies in logic that could never give uniformity, or con-
sistency, or reliability in thinking; a mechanical re-
flex system of epistemology that limits the acquirement 
of knowledge to muscular apprehension; a hedonistic and 
deterministic ethics on a trial-and-error basis; and to 
no religion at all, but to a crass materialism. 
Of course one may be a behaviorist without accept-
ing these extreme views. He may be a moderate behav-
iorist, and that might mean almost anything from a lit-
tle more than an introspectionist to a little less than 
128 
a strict behaviorist. It is the privilege of every 
thinker to examine the behavioristic theory, or hypothe-
sis, in general and in the light of its logical conclus-
ions, and accept what seems to him to be true and reject 
what seems to him to be false. If one rejects the con-
clusions but accepts the logic of rea~oning that reaches 
those conclusions, he must also reject the basic assump-
tion from which those conclusions are drawn. 
If there were time and space sufficient it would 
be both interesting and helpful to follow out the im-
plications of each of the types of behaviorism listed 
in the introductory Chapter. If this could be done 
perhaps it would be found that purposive behaviorism 
would lead to somewhat different philosophical con-
clusions from some of these presented in t h is thesis. 
Behaviorism of t his type refuses to recognize mental or 
conscious activity, but it does recognize the object-
ively observable fact that behavior is a goal-seeking 
process. This is not the extreme position that is 
championed by Watson and others. But it would be diffi-
cult to reconcile it with the denial of conscious activ-
ity, for purposive behavior implies the selection of 
means toward an end, which, in turn, would seem to call 
for what we have been terming conscious activity. So it 
would seem that purposive behaviorism would have to lead 
to extreme behaviorism to be consistent. 
l~ 
The near behaviori~ that McDougall describes would 
leave the way open for a variety of implications and con-
clusions. The behaviorists of this group neither deny 
nor totally ignore the facts of conscious activity, but 
they refuse to use introspectively observable facts. It 
is evident that one cannot deal specifically with such 
an elastic position as this. It would be necessary to 
consider the views of each individual near behaviorist. 
This would be interesting but unending. 
There will arise other types of behaviorists and 
their positions will lead to different philosophic 
conclusions. And so this thesis cannot be said to be 
complete. The finished and final thesis in philosophy 
has not been written--perhaps never will be. 
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